Executive summary

This report, part of an annual series, presents trend data beginning with 1999 about several aspects of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system: claims, benefits and costs; vocational rehabilitation; and disputes and dispute resolution. Its purpose is to describe statistically the current status and direction of workers’ compensation in Minnesota and to offer explanations, where possible, for recent developments.

While this *Workers’ Compensation System Report* does not include COVID-19 claims, some of the statistics involve activities taking place in 2020 for workers’ compensation claims occurring in 2019 and earlier years. In future reports, injury rates for 2020 and beyond, and costs for 2020 and prior injuries, will reflect effects from COVID-19 (see p. 2). The Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) produced a report on COVID-19 workers’ compensation claims in January 2021 and posts updated COVID-19 claims statistics on its COVID-19 resources page.¹

The following are the report’s major findings.²

**Chapter 2 — Claims, benefits and costs: overview**

- There were 4.1 paid claims per 100 full-time-equivalent workers in 2019, down 50% from 1999.

- Adjusting for average wage growth, both medical and indemnity benefits per insured claim rose rapidly between 1999 and 2003, but showed little net change thereafter. Adjusted indemnity and medical benefits per claim were both 1% lower in 2018 than in 2003. The average cost of a 2018 workers’ compensation claim was $10,870 for medical and indemnity benefits combined (including vocational rehabilitation).

- Relative to total payroll, indemnity benefits were down 29% between 1999 and 2019, while medical benefits were down 31%. These trends are the net result of a falling claim rate and higher (wage-adjusted) benefits per claim. Medical and indemnity benefits (including vocational rehabilitation) amounted to $.70 per $100 of payroll for 2019.

  ➢ By counteracting the increase in benefits per claim, the falling claim rate has brought benefits per $100 of payroll to historically low levels, which has affected pure premium rates and system cost per $100 of payroll.

- Pure premium rates for 2021 were down 35% from 1999, in a consistent downward trend.

- The total cost of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system was an estimated $1.62 billion for 2019, or $1.01 per $100 of payroll.

  ➢ Total system cost per $100 of payroll follows a multi-year cycle in line with a nationwide insurance pricing cycle; however, extrapolating from comparable periods in the cycle indicates a decrease of 41% over 20 years.

- In 2019, on a current-payment basis, the three largest components of total workers’ compensation system cost were medical benefits (35%), insurer expenses (30%) and indemnity benefits excluding vocational rehabilitation (29%).
Chapter 3 — Claims, benefits and costs: detail

- After adjusting for average wage growth, per paid indemnity claim:
  - total disability benefits (temporary total and permanent total disability benefits combined) have remained relatively stable since 2002;
  - temporary partial disability benefits fell 24% from 1999 to 2017;
  - permanent partial disability benefits fell 62% from 1999 to 2018; and
  - settlement benefits rose 56% from 1999 to 2016, with a majority of this increase occurring by 2009 (settlement benefits may include indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits); this happened through an increase in the proportion of claims with these benefits and an increase in adjusted average settlement benefits where they were paid.

Chapter 4 — Vocational rehabilitation

- Participation in vocational rehabilitation rose from 17% of paid indemnity claims for injury-year 1999 to 23% for 2019.
- After adjusting for average wage growth, the average cost of vocational rehabilitation services per participant for injury-year 2019 ($8,750) was 11% below the level in 1999 and 22% below its 2007 peak.
- Vocational rehabilitation accounted for an estimated 2.8% of total workers’ compensation system cost in 2019.

Chapter 5 — Disputes and dispute resolution

Because the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) has a court case-management system (C-Track) separate from the DLI workers’ compensation data system, the Workers’ Compensation System Report currently includes dispute-resolution statistics from DLI but not OAH. As DLI and OAH work together to enhance data-sharing between C-Track and the new DLI system (Work Comp Campus\(^3\)), future reports may also include OAH dispute-resolution statistics.

- For 2016, 21% of filed indemnity claims are projected to have one or more disputes of any type.
  - The rates of all component dispute types (claim petitions, discontinuance disputes, medical disputes and rehabilitation disputes) increased substantially between 1999 and 2008.
  - Since 2008, dispute rates have largely leveled off.
  - The percentage of paid indemnity claims with claimant attorney involvement rose from 17% in 1999 to 24% in 2017.

- Concerning dispute resolution at DLI:
  - The certification rate for medical and vocational rehabilitation disputes combined dropped from 67% in 1999 to 49% in 2020.
  - About 29% of both certified medical disputes and certified rehabilitation disputes were referred to OAH in 2020.
  - About 60% of the dispute resolution proceedings at DLI for 2018 to 2020 were mediations; the remaining 40% were administrative conferences.
  - About 86% of resolutions at DLI for 2018 through 2020 were by agreement — most of these by informal intervention, but a significant number (25% of DLI resolutions) by agreement via conference or mediation. The remaining 14% of DLI resolutions were decision-and-orders.

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\(^3\) “Campus” stands for “Claims Access and Management Platform User System.”
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Nationwide, workers’ compensation claim rates have declined throughout the past 20 years. During the same period, indemnity benefits per claim have increased at about the same rate as wages, while medical benefits per claim increased more than wages through 2008 but have been largely stable relative to wages since then.\textsuperscript{4}

In Minnesota, relative to wages, indemnity and medical benefits per claim rose steeply from 1999 to 2003 but have shown little net change thereafter. A falling claim rate in Minnesota has counteracted the increases in total benefits per claim relative to wages, causing both indemnity and medical benefits per $100 of payroll to be substantially lower in 2019 than in 1999.

This report, part of an annual series, presents trend data about several aspects of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system: claims, benefits and costs; vocational rehabilitation; and disputes and dispute resolution.\textsuperscript{5} Like other reports in the series, this report presents data from the most recently available 20-year window, beginning with 1999 for the present report. The report’s purpose is to describe statistically the current status and direction of workers’ compensation in Minnesota and to offer explanations, where possible, for recent developments.

Chapter 2 presents overall claim, benefit and cost data. Chapter 3 provides more detailed data about indemnity (monetary) benefit trends. Chapters 4 provides statistics about vocational rehabilitation. Chapter 5 deals with disputes and dispute resolution. To understand the major findings at the beginning of each chapter, readers may need to refer to the background material immediately following the major findings in question.


\textbf{Developed statistics} — Many statistics in this report (from both the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) and the insurance industry) are presented by injury-year (“accident year” in the insurance data), insurance policy-year or vocational rehabilitation plan-closure year.\textsuperscript{6} An issue with injury-year and policy-year data is that the originally reported numbers for more recent years are not mature because of longer claims and reporting lags. In this report, all injury-year and policy-year data is “developed” to a uniform maturity to produce statistics that are comparable over time. The technique uses “development factors” (projection factors) based on observed data for older claims.\textsuperscript{7}

The injury-year and policy-year statistics that result from this technique are projections of what the actual numbers will be when all claims are complete and all data is reported. Therefore, the statistics for any given injury-year (especially for more recent years) are subject to change when more recent data become available.


\textsuperscript{5} “Benefits” in this report refers to monetary benefits, medical benefits and vocational rehabilitation benefits. “Costs” refers to the combined costs of these benefits and other costs such as insurer expenses. Using 1999 as the base year gives a 20-year observation window through 2019.

\textsuperscript{6} Definitions in Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{7} Development occurs in vocational rehabilitation (VR) plan-closure-year data because a claim may have more than one VR plan and the plan-closure-year statistics are computed for all plans combined, categorized by the closure year of the last plan. See Appendix C for more detail about the claim development techniques for the injury-year, policy-year and plan-closure-year data.
DLI reviews the developed statistics each year to determine their stability and suitability for publication. Through this process, DLI has determined that some of the developed statistics from its own data for the most recent injury-years are not sufficiently stable for publication. As a result, some of the trends from DLI-developed statistics in this report extend only through 2016, 2017 or 2018.

Adjustment of cost data for wage growth —
Some figures in this report present average or median costs per claim or per vocational rehabilitation (VR) plan over time. As wages and prices grow, a given cost in dollar terms represents a progressively smaller economic burden from one year to the next. If the total cost of indemnity and medical benefits grows at the same rate as wages, there is no net change in cost as a percentage of total payroll. Therefore, all costs per claim or per VR plan are adjusted for average wage growth. The adjusted trends reflect the extent to which cost growth per claim or per VR plan exceeds (or falls short of) average wage growth.8

COVID-19 — This the first Workers’ Compensation System Report whose statistics will be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The effect is indirect for this report. This report includes statistics through injury-year 2019, so the rate and composition of claims in this report are unaffected by the pandemic. However, some data reflect claim activity that occurred after the pandemic took hold. For example, the DLI data for this report was taken from the DLI database in fall 2020. Costs for pre-COVID-19 injuries, as reflected in the data, could be affected as injured workers had difficulty returning to work in the economic downturn or had fears of doing so in a potentially dangerous work environment.

Additionally, since “developed statistics” (see above) are computed with projection factors based on historical data, the actual numbers when claims are mature (being affected by COVID-19 factors) may differ from earlier projections based largely on pre-COVID-19 projection factors.

In future reports, which will present data for injury-year 2020 and beyond, claim rates will be affected not only by the appearance of COVID-19 claims, but also by changes in the composition of employment with respect to industry and occupation and remote work, and costs per claim will be affected as described above.

8 See Appendix C for computational details.
This chapter presents overall indicators of the status and direction of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.

**Major findings**

- The total number of paid claims dropped 50% relative to the number of full-time-equivalent workers from 1999 to 2019 (Figure 2.1).

- Adjusting for average wage growth, both medical and indemnity benefits per insured claim rose rapidly between 1999 and 2003, but showed little net change thereafter. Adjusted indemnity and medical benefits per claim were 1% lower in 2018 than in 2003 (Figure 2.3).

- Relative to total payroll, indemnity benefits were down 29% between 1999 and 2019, while medical benefits were down 34% (Figure 2.4). These trends are the net result of a falling claim rate and higher (wage-adjusted) benefits per claim.

  - By countering the increase in benefits per claim, the falling claim rate has brought benefits per $100 of payroll to historically low levels, which has, in turn, affected pure premium rates and system cost per $100 of payroll.

- Pure premium rates for 2021 were down 35% from 1999 (Figure 2.6).

- The total cost of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system relative to payroll follows a multi-year cycle, but a comparison of similar points in the cycle indicates a long-term decrease that extrapolates to 41% over a 20-year period (Figure 2.7).

- In 2019, on a current-payment basis, the three largest components of total workers’ compensation system cost were medical benefits (35%), insurer expenses (30%) and indemnity benefits other than vocational rehabilitation (29%) (Figure 2.8).

- Benefits per $100 of payroll, pure premium rates and system cost per $100 of payroll all decreased at roughly 2% a year during the past 20 years. This is to be expected given the claim rate decreased by roughly 4% annually and wage-adjusted cost per claim increased by about 2% annually during the same period. That is, the downward pressure exerted by the falling claim rate on cost relative to payroll was partly offset by the increase in wage-adjusted cost per claim (Figure 2.9).

**Background**

The following basic information is necessary for understanding the figures in this chapter. See the glossary in Appendix A for more detail.

**Workers’ compensation benefits and claim types**

Workers’ compensation provides three basic types of benefits.

- **Monetary benefits** compensate the injured or ill worker (or surviving dependents) for wage loss, permanent functional impairment or death. These benefits are often called **indemnity benefits**. They are considered in detail in Chapter 3.

- **Medical benefits** consist of reasonable and necessary medical services and supplies related to the injury or illness.
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) benefits consist of a variety of services to help eligible injured workers return to work. With very few exceptions, only workers receiving monetary benefits receive VR benefits. VR benefits are counted as indemnity benefits in insurance data but are counted separately in DLI data. They are considered in detail in Chapter 4.

Claims with indemnity benefits (including VR benefits in insurance data) are called indemnity claims; these claims typically have medical benefits also. The remainder of claims are called medical-only claims because they only have medical benefits.

Insurance arrangements

Employers cover themselves for workers’ compensation in one of three ways. The most common is to purchase insurance in the “voluntary market,” so named because an insurer may choose whether to insure any particular employer. Employers unable to insure in the voluntary market may insure through the Assigned Risk Plan, the insurance program of last resort administered by the Minnesota Department of Commerce. Employers meeting certain financial requirements, either individually or through a group, may self-insure.

Rate setting

Minnesota is an open-rating state for workers’ compensation, meaning that rates are set by insurance companies rather than by a central authority. In determining their rates, insurance companies start with “pure premium rates” (also known as “advisory loss costs”). These rates represent expected losses (indemnity and medical) per $100 of payroll for some 600 payroll classifications. The Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWCIA) — Minnesota’s workers’ compensation data service organization and rating bureau — annually calculates the pure premium rates for the next year from insurers’ most recent pure premium (computed from prior pure premium rates and payroll) and indemnity and medical losses. Insurance companies add their own expenses to the pure premium rates and make other modifications in determining their own rates (which are filed with the Department of Commerce).

The pure premium rates are calculated from data for two to three years prior, which produces a lag between benefit trends and pure premium rate changes.
Claim rates

A starting point for understanding trends in the Minnesota workers’ compensation system is the claim rate — the number of paid claims per 100 full-time-equivalent (FTE) workers. With the exception of the past two years, claim rates declined nearly continually from 1999 to 2019.

- In 2019, there were:
  - 0.97 paid indemnity claims per 100 FTE workers, down 42% from 1999;
  - 3.2 paid medical-only claims per 100 FTE workers, down 52% from 1999; and
  - 4.1 total paid claims per 100 FTE workers, down 50% from 1999.

- The rates of indemnity, medical-only and total claims reached low-points in 2016 and 2017; in 2019 they were about the same as in 2015.

- Since 2009, indemnity claims have made up 23% to 24% of all paid claims, with medical-only claims constituting the remaining 76% to 77%. The indemnity claim percentage relative to total claims represents an increase from 20% for 1999.

- Since 1999, the total claim rate has followed a similar downward trend to Minnesota’s total reportable case rate from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses.⁹

- Because of the falling claim rate, the number of claims has fallen despite an increase in the number of covered workers. In 2019, there were an estimated 22,200 paid indemnity claims and 95,000 total paid claims, down 35% and 44%, respectively, from 1999.

- The falling claim rate has direct negative effects on benefits per $100 of payroll (Figure 2.4) and workers’ compensation system cost per $100 of payroll (Figure 2.7).

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⁹ This survey (the “SOII”) is conducted jointly by state agencies and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. See www.dli.mn.gov/our-areas-service/research-and-statistics/survey-occupational-injuries-and-illnesses for Minnesota injury and illness rates from the SOII and for a description of the SOII itself.
Insurance arrangements

The voluntary market share of the workers’ compensation insurance market is somewhat higher than the low-point reached in the mid-2000s.

- The voluntary market share of paid indemnity claims was 73% in 2019, representing an increase from the low-point of 68% for 2005, but down from the 76% mark reached in 1999.
- The self-insured share, 26% for 2019, has ranged from 25% to 27% since 2003; its low-point was 22% for 1999.
- The Assigned Risk Plan share has generally ranged from 2% to 3% for the period shown, with a high-point of 6.4% in 2004 and a low-point of 1.1% in 2019.
- These shifts are at least partly due to changes in insurance costs shown in Figure 2.7. Cost increases in the voluntary market tend to cause shifts from the voluntary market to both the Assigned Risk Plan and self-insurance, while cost decreases in the voluntary market tend to cause shifts in the opposite direction.
- These figures have generally followed similar trends to market-share percentages based on pure premium.10

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10 The pure premium figures used in this comparison are from the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association.
Benefits per claim

Adjusting for average wage growth, both medical and indemnity benefits per insured claim rose rapidly between 1999 and 2003, but showed little net change thereafter (Figure 2.3).

- For all claims combined, in 2018 relative to 2003:
  ➢ average indemnity benefits were down less than 1%;
  ➢ average medical benefits were down 1%; and
  ➢ average total benefits were down 1%.

- For all claims combined, average indemnity benefits were 26% higher in 2018 than in 1999; average medical benefits were 40% higher; and average total benefits were 33% higher. All of the increases concerned happened between 1999 and 2003.

- Statutory changes in the past few years concerning medical-service reimbursement and indemnity benefits have affected the benefit trends displayed in this figure.
  ➢ Effective Jan. 1, 2016, Minnesota changed its method of paying for workers’ compensation inpatient hospital services. The change was from a charge-based system to a “DRG” system based on Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective Payment System.11 DLI estimated that in its first year, this change reduced inpatient hospital cost by 9% to 16% and total workers’ compensation medical cost by 1.3% to 2.3%, relative to what these costs would otherwise have been.12 In panels A and C of Figure 2.3 (the medical-only claims in panel B are unlikely to involve hospitalizations), average medical benefits per claim rose between policy years 2015 and 2016 after adjusting for average wage growth. The DLI finding implies that these per-claim benefits would have risen by a larger amount had it not been for the switch to the new inpatient reimbursement system.

  ➢ On Oct. 1, 2018, a new system took effect for reimbursing ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) for their services. Before the new Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System (ASCPs) began operating, the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) estimated that it would reduce ASC payments by 20% and workers’ compensation medical costs by 2.1% relative to what they would have been under the prior system.13 Using data that became available after ASCP took effect, DLI estimated the new system had reduced payments to ASCs by 25%,14 which would lead to a 2.6% reduction in overall medical costs.15
  ➢ For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2018, indemnity benefit changes took effect that, by DLI’s estimate, raised total indemnity benefits by 2.0% relative to what they otherwise would have been.16
  ➢ The ASC payment and indemnity benefit changes, since they took effect in the last quarter of 2018, would have only a small effect on the last year (2018) shown in Figure 2.3. The full effects of these changes will be felt in 2019, which will be included in this figure in the next Workers’ Compensation System Report.
  ➢ A new system for reimbursing hospitals for outpatient facility services also took effect Oct. 1, 2018, but this new system, by statute, was structured to leave total payments to these facilities unchanged.

- The benefits per claim shown in Figure 2.3 have a direct effect on benefits per $100 of payroll (Figure 2.4) and, thereby, on workers’ compensation system cost per $100 of payroll (Figure 2.7).

13 Unpublished estimate.
15 This is based on an estimate from the Workers’ Compensation Medical Call data (shared with DLI by the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association) that payments to ASCs accounted for 10.3% of workers’ compensation medical costs.
16 For details on all of these changes, see Appendix A (pp. 67 and 68) and Appendix B (pp. 76 and 77).
Figure 2.3  Average indemnity and medical benefits per insured claim, adjusted for wage growth, policy-years 1999-2018 [1]

**A: Indemnity claims**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$18,510</td>
<td>$17,800</td>
<td>$36,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22,290</td>
<td>24,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>20,390</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>42,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from MWCIA data (see Appendix C). Includes the voluntary market and Assigned Risk Plan; excludes self-insured employers. Benefits are adjusted for average wage growth between the respective year and 2019. 2018 is the most recent year available.

2. Since these statistics are from insurance data, indemnity benefits include vocational rehabilitation benefits.

**B: Medical-only claims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy year</th>
<th>Medical benefits</th>
<th>Total benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$850</td>
<td>$850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>1,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C: All claims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$3,810</td>
<td>$4,340</td>
<td>$8,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>6,130</td>
<td>10,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>12,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>7,220</td>
<td>12,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>10,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,160</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>11,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,120</td>
<td>6,410</td>
<td>11,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>10,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Benefits relative to payroll

Relative to total payroll, indemnity and medical benefits are now substantially lower than in 1999.

- During the 20 years shown, relative to payroll, indemnity and medical benefits reached peaks in 2001 and 2003, respectively; both fell almost continually thereafter, with the exception of the past three years.

- In 2019 as compared to 1999, relative to payroll:
  - indemnity benefits were 29% lower;
  - medical benefits were 34% lower; and
  - total benefits were 31% lower.

- These changes are the net result of a decreasing claim rate (Figure 2.1) and higher indemnity and medical benefits per claim (as adjusted for average wage growth) (Figure 2.3).

- Recent changes concerning medical-service reimbursement and indemnity benefits, discussed in the context of Figure 2.3, are also relevant in viewing Figure 2.4.

- The falling benefits per $100 of payroll have a direct negative effect on pure premium rates (Figure 2.6) and, thereby, on workers’ compensation system cost per $100 of payroll (Figure 2.7).

![Figure 2.4 Benefits per $100 of payroll in the voluntary market, accident-years 1999-2019 [1]](image_url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident year</th>
<th>Indemnity [2]</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$.47</td>
<td>$.54</td>
<td>$1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from MWCIA data (see Appendix C). Excludes self-insured employers, the Assigned Risk Plan and those benefits paid through DLI programs (including supplementary and second-injury benefits).
2. Includes vocational rehabilitation benefits.
Indemnity and medical shares

The medical share of total benefits rose from 1999 to 2012, but has fallen since 2012. The increase through 2012 occurred primarily from 2002 to 2008.

- Reflecting the data in Figure 2.4:
  - medical benefits rose from a 53% share of total benefits in 1999 to 58% in 2012, but fell back to 51% by 2019; and
  - indemnity benefits fell to 42% by 2012, but increased to 49% by 2019.

Pure premium rates

Pure premium rates have decreased substantially since 1999.

- The 2021 rates were down 35% from 1999.
- The rates fell 20% between 2015 and 2021 alone.¹⁷
- Pure premium rates, determined by MWClA, are ultimately driven by the trend in benefits relative to payroll (Figure 2.4). However, this occurs with a lag of two to three years because the pure premium rates for any period are derived from prior premium and loss experience.¹⁸
- Insurers in the voluntary market consider the pure premium rates, along with other factors, in determining their own rates, which, in turn, affect total system cost (Figure 2.7).

---

¹⁷ A “percent change” means the proportionate change in the initial percentage, not the number of percentage points of change. For example, a change from 10% to either 5% or 15% is a 50% change.

¹⁸ Changes in pure premium rates directly following law changes also include anticipated effects of those law changes as estimated by MWClA.

---

Figure 2.5 Indemnity and medical benefit shares in the voluntary market, accident-years 1999-2019 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident year</th>
<th>Indemnity benefits [2]</th>
<th>Medical benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Note 1 in Figure 2.4 applies here.
2. Includes vocational rehabilitation benefits.

Figure 2.6 Average pure premium rate as percentage of 1999 level, 1999-2021 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective year</th>
<th>Percentage of 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from MWClA. Pure premium rates represent expected indemnity and medical losses per $100 of covered payroll in the voluntary market (see p. 4). Since MWClA has been increasing the loss maturity in its calculations for the past few years, the rates shown here are adjusted to reflect a constant loss maturity (see Appendix C, p. 79).
System cost

The total cost of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system per $100 of payroll has followed a cycle since 1999, with low-points reached in 2000 and 2010 and high-points in 2004 and 2012. Amid the annual fluctuations, the long-term trend is downward.

- The total cost of the system was an estimated $1.01 per $100 of payroll in 2019, well below the previous low point reached in 2010.

- The total cost of workers’ compensation in 2019 was an estimated $1.62 billion.

- These figures reflect benefits (indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation) plus other costs such as insurance brokerage, underwriting, claim adjustment, litigation, and taxes and assessments. They are computed primarily from actual premium for insured employers (adjusted for costs under deductible limits) and experience-modified pure premium for self-insured employers (see Appendix C).

- These figures partly reflect trends in pure premium rates (Figure 2.6) and in insurance expenses relative to payroll; however, they also reflect a nationwide insurance pricing cycle, in which the ratio of premium to insurance losses varies over time.19

- The average system cost per $100 of payroll was $1.53 for 2000 to 2009, and $1.18 for 2010 to 2019 — two comparable cycles 10 years apart; this indicates a long-term downward trend with a 23% decrease between the two cycles. Extrapolated to 20 years, this would be a 41% decrease.20 This is close to the average pure premium rate decrease of 35% for 1999 to 2021, which is to be expected because insurers use the pure premium rates as the starting point for determining their filed premium rates.

---


20 \((1 – .23)^2 – 1 = .41\).
System cost components

The largest share of total workers’ compensation system cost goes to medical benefits.

- In 2019, on a current-payment basis, medical benefits accounted for an estimated 35% of total system cost, followed by insurer expenses at 30% and indemnity benefits other than vocational rehabilitation at 29%.

- Total benefit payments accounted for 67% of total system cost.

- As shown in Figure 2.5, the indemnity and medical shares of total benefits have varied over time.

- As shown in Figure 3.14, state agency administrative cost has declined relative to payroll since 1999.

Figure 2.8 System cost components, 2019 [1]

1. Estimated by DLI with data from several sources. These numbers are on a current-payment basis and differ from others estimated on an injury-year or policy-year basis. Because these numbers follow a multi-year cycle, they are averaged over the most recent complete cycle (see Appendix C).

2. Indemnity and medical benefits include those reimbursed through DLI programs (including supplementary and second-injury benefits) and those paid through insurance guaranty entities (the Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Association and the Self-Insurers’ Security Fund). Indemnity benefits include those claimant attorney costs that are paid out of indemnity benefits. Indemnity benefits here exclude vocational rehabilitation.

3. Includes underwriting, brokerage, claim adjustment, litigation, general operations, taxes, fees and profit. Litigation costs include defense attorney costs plus those claimant attorney costs that do not come out of indemnity benefits but are paid by the insurer. Excludes assessments on insurers and self-insurers because the benefits and state administration financed with those assessments are counted elsewhere in the figure.

4. Includes costs of workers’ compensation functions in DLI, the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals and the Department of Commerce, as well as the state share of the cost of Minnesota’s OSHA program. Excludes costs of benefit payments reimbursed by the Special Compensation Fund (such as supplementary and second-injury benefits). Costs are net of fees for service.
Annual rates of change in key measures

At earlier points in this chapter, it is pointed out that (1) benefits per $100 of payroll depend on the total paid claim rate and average benefits per claim (as adjusted for wage growth) and (2) the average pure premium rate and system cost per $100 of payroll depend on benefits per $100 of payroll. Figure 2.9 summarizes these relationships by presenting average annual rates of change for these key measures of the workers’ compensation system.

- Combining the rates of change in the claim rate and benefits per claim (adjusted for average wage growth) gives an average annual rate of change of -2.2%. As expected, this is close to the average annual rate of change in benefits per $100 of payroll of -2.4% (see note 4 in figure).

- The rate of change in the average pure premium rate (-1.8%) is somewhat less (in absolute terms) than the rate of change in benefits per $100 of payroll (-2.4%). An exact match is not expected because of different data sources and the fact that the pure premium rates reflect the computational methodology of MWCIA in addition to actual loss experience.

- The rate of change in system cost per $100 of payroll (-2.6%) is closer to the rate of change in benefits per $100 of payroll (-2.4%) than to the rate of change in the average pure premium rate (-1.8%). Exact correspondence is not expected because of differences in the measures (see note 7).

Figure 2.9 Annual rates of change in key measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Beginning period</th>
<th>Ending period</th>
<th>Average annual rate of change [1]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Combined change in total claim rate and total benefits per total claim [4]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Average pure premium rate [6]</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>2020-2021</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The average annual rate of change is computed from the average value for the beginning period to the average value for the ending period. The number of years used in computing the rate of change is from the mid-point of the beginning period to the mid-point of the ending period.
2. From Figure 2.1.
3. From Panel C of Figure 2.3. Adjusted for average wage growth.
4. \((1 - 3.6\%) \times (1 + 1.5\%) - 1 = -2.2\%\). Since the growth in benefits per claim used in this calculation is adjusted for average wage growth, the combined average annual change of -2.2% can be viewed as an expectation regarding the rate of change in total benefits per $100 of payroll (line 4). The exact relationship is this: claims per 100 FTE workers (i.e., claim rate, line 1) x (benefits per claim ÷ wages per worker) (i.e., wage-adjusted benefits per total claim, line 2) = benefits per $100 of payroll (i.e., line 4). This relationship is only approximate in the actual data because the three measures have different data sources.
5. From Figure 2.4. See note 4.
6. From Figure 2.6. MWCIA computes the pure premium rate change every year essentially by comparing historical pure premium (computed by applying historical pure premium rates to payroll) to total claim costs (or “benefits”). It is expected that, in the long run, the pure premium rates will change at about the same rate as benefits per $100 of payroll (line 4). This relationship is only approximate because the two measures have different data sources and because the pure premium rates reflect MWCIA’s computational methodology in addition to actual loss experience.
7. From Figure 2.7. Because system cost per $100 of payroll follows an approximately 10-year cycle, the beginning and ending periods for this measure are 10 years apart. Also, because of the variability of the cyclical pattern from one cycle to the next, the averages are taken over all 10 years in each cycle. System cost is primarily a premium-based number and individual insurers use the pure premium rates as the starting point in establishing their own premium rates each year. It is expected that, in the long run, system cost per $100 of payroll will change at about the same rate as the average pure premium rate. This relationship is only approximate because the two measures have different data sources, system cost reflects insurer pricing behavior and system cost includes self-insured employers, while the average pure premium rate does not.
This chapter presents additional data about workers’ compensation claims, benefits and costs. Most of the data provides further detail about the indemnity claim and benefit information in Chapter 2. Some of the data relates to costs of special benefit programs and state agency administrative functions. Some developed statistics by injury-year from DLI data are not given all the way through 2019 because the most recent years are not always sufficiently stable (see Chapter 1).

Major findings

- The average amount of time an injured worker received total disability benefits for injury-year 2016 was 15% longer than for 1999, but about the same as for 2003; the average duration of temporary partial disability (TPD) fell by 9% from 1999 to 2017 (Figure 3.3).

- After adjusting for average wage growth:
  - Settlement benefits per paid indemnity claim rose 56% from 1999 to 2016, with a majority of the increase occurring by 2009 (Figure 3.10). This resulted from a 39% increase in the proportion of claims with settlement benefits (Figure 3.2) and a 14% increase in the wage-adjusted average amount of these benefits where they were paid (Figure 3.9).
  - Total disability benefits (temporary total and permanent total disability benefits combined) per paid indemnity claim were about the same for injury-year 2016 as for 1999 (Figure 3.10). This reflects a stable trend in the proportion of claims with these benefits (Figure 3.2) and a small net change in the average amount of these benefits where they were paid (Figure 3.9).
  - TPD benefits per paid indemnity claim fell 24% from 1999 to 2017 (Figure 3.10). This resulted from declines in the proportion of claims with TPD benefits (Figure 3.2), in the average duration of these benefits (Figure 3.3) and in the wage-adjusted average weekly amounts of these benefits (Figure 3.4).
  - Permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits per paid indemnity claim fell by 62% from 1999 to 2018 (Figure 3.10). This occurred primarily because, under the fixed PPD benefit schedule, PPD benefits became smaller relative to rising wages. Other factors were a decline in the percentage of claims with PPD benefits, a decline in the average PPD impairment rating and increases in statutory benefit levels in 2000 and 2018, but these were relatively minor.

- DLI indemnity benefits per paid indemnity claim and per $100 of payroll follow closely their counterparts computed from Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWClA) data (Figures 3.11 and 3.12).

- The Special Compensation Fund assessment rate fell from 30.0% of paid indemnity benefits in 1999 to 13.7% in 2021 (Figure 3.15). This reflects decreasing liabilities under the supplementary and second-injury benefit programs and other factors (Figure 3.13).

Background

The following basic information is necessary for understanding the figures in this chapter. See the glossary in Appendix A for more detail.
Benefit types

- **Temporary total disability (TTD)** — A weekly wage-replacement benefit paid to an employee who is temporarily unable to work because of a work-related injury or illness, equal to two-thirds of pre-injury earnings subject to a weekly minimum and maximum and a duration limit. TTD ends when the employee returns to work (or when certain other events occur).

- **Temporary partial disability (TPD)** — A weekly wage-replacement benefit paid to an injured employee who has returned to work at less than his or her pre-injury earnings, generally equal to two-thirds of the difference between current earnings and pre-injury earnings and subject to weekly maximum and duration provisions.

- **Permanent partial disability (PPD)** — A benefit that compensates for permanent functional impairment resulting from a work-related injury or illness. The benefit is based on an impairment rating that ranges from 0% to 100%. The benefit amount is derived by multiplying the impairment rating by a statutory benefit amount per rating point that increases for higher ratings. The total benefit is unrelated to pre-injury earnings.

- **Permanent total disability (PTD)** — A weekly wage-replacement benefit paid to an employee who sustains one of the severe work-related injuries specified in law or who, because of a work-related injury or illness in combination with other factors, is permanently unable to secure gainful employment (subject to a permanent impairment rating threshold).

- **Settlement benefits** — Indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits included in a claim settlement — “stipulation for settlement” — agreed to by the parties to a claim and include the worker's attorney fees. A settlement usually occurs in a dispute, and settlement benefits are usually paid in a lump sum.

- **Total disability** — The combination of TTD and PTD benefits. Most figures in this chapter — those presenting DLI data — use this category because the DLI data does not fully distinguish between TTD and PTD benefits.

Counting claims and benefits: insurance data and department data

The first figure in this chapter uses insurance data from the MWCIA; all other figures use Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) data; two figures present DLI and MWCIA data side-by-side.

In the insurance data from MWCIA, claims and benefits are categorized by “claim type,” defined according to the most severe type of benefit on the claim. In increasing severity, the benefit types are medical, temporary disability (TTD or TPD), PPD, PTD and death. For example, a claim with medical, TTD and PPD payments is a PPD claim. PPD claims also include claims with temporary disability benefits lasting more than 130 weeks and claims with settlements. In the insurance data, all benefits on a claim are counted in the one claim-type category into which the claim falls.

In the DLI data, by contrast, each claim may be counted in more than one category, depending on the types of benefits paid. For example, the same claim may be counted among claims with total disability benefits and among claims with PPD benefits.

Costs supported by Special Compensation Fund assessment

DLI, through its Special Compensation Fund, levies an annual assessment on insurers and self-insured employers to finance (1) costs in DLI, the Office of Administrative Hearings and other state agencies to administer the workers’ compensation system, and (2) certain benefits for which DLI is responsible. Primary among these benefits are **supplementary benefits** and **second-injury benefits**. Although these programs were eliminated in the 1990s, benefits must still be paid on prior claims (see Appendix A). The assessment (or benefits and administrative costs paid with the assessment) is included in total workers’ compensation system cost (Figures 2.7 and 2.8).
Benefits by claim type

In the insurance data, PPD claims account for the majority of total benefits. Each claim type contributes to total benefits paid depending on its relative frequency and average benefit.

In the insurance data, the benefits for each claim type include all types of benefits paid on that type of claim. PPD claims, for example, may include medical, TTD, TPD and vocational rehabilitation benefits in addition to PPD benefits.

- PPD claims accounted for 62% of total benefits in 2017 (panel C in Figure 3.1) through a combination of moderately low frequency (panel A) and substantially higher-than-average benefits per claim (panel B).

- Other claim types contributed smaller amounts to total benefits because of very low frequency (PTD and death claims) or relatively low average benefits (medical-only and temporary disability claims).

- Indemnity claims were 24% of all paid claims, but accounted for 91% of total benefits because they have far higher benefits, on average, than medical-only claims ($43,800 versus $1,310 for 2017). Medical-only claims accounted for 76% of claims, but only 9% of total benefits.

---

**Figure 3.1 Benefits by claim type for insured claims, policy-year 2017 [1]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical-only claims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Percentage of all claims</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Average benefit</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$1,100,000</td>
<td>$272,000</td>
<td>$43,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Average benefit</td>
<td>$1,310</td>
<td>$16,800</td>
<td>$93,000</td>
<td>$272,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$4,380</td>
<td>$11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Percentage of total benefits (indemnity and medical)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Percentage of total benefits (indemnity and medical)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Developed statistics from MWClIA data (see Appendix C). 2017 is the most recent year available.
2. Indemnity claims consist of all claim types other than medical-only. These claims typically have both indemnity and medical benefits.
3. PPD claims in the insurance data, and as shown here, include any claims with settlements or with temporary disability lasting more than 130 weeks, in addition to claims with PPD.
4. Because of large annual fluctuations, data for PTD and death claims is averaged over 2013 to 2017 (see Appendix C).
5. Benefit amounts in panel B are adjusted for overall wage growth between 2017 and 2019.
Claims by benefit type

A majority of paid indemnity claims have total disability benefits, but only minorities of claims receive the other benefit types (Figure 3.2). The proportion with settlement benefits has shown a substantial increase since 1999; the proportion with PPD benefits has fallen significantly since 2009 after rising gradually before that time; the proportions with total disability and TPD benefits have changed by smaller amounts.

- For injury-year 2017 (the most recent year available for all four benefit types), 83% of paid indemnity claims received total disability benefits. The proportion receiving the other benefit types shown ranged from 17% to 27%.

- The percentage of claims with settlement benefits rose 39% from 1999 to 2017. This is related to a similar increase in the dispute rate (Figure 5.1).

- The percentage of claims with PPD benefits rose gradually from 1999 to 2009 but fell 34% between that year and 2019.

- The percentage of claims with total disability benefits has remained quite stable throughout the period, with minimal yearly fluctuations.

- The percentage of claims with TPD benefits has fallen gradually during the period.

---

21 See note 17 on p. 11.
Figure 3.2 Percentages of paid indemnity claims with selected types of benefits, injury-years 1999-2019 [1]

A. Four benefit types, injury-year 2017 [2]

B. Table of values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>82.7%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Total disability benefits [3], injury-years 1999-2019

D. TPD, PPD and settlement benefits [4], injury-years 1999-2019

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C). An indemnity claim may have more than one type of benefit paid; therefore, the sum of the percentages for the different benefit types is greater than 100%.

2. Injury-year 2017 is shown here because it is the most-recent year for which the values for all four benefit types are sufficiently stable (see Table of values and note 5).

3. Total disability includes TTD and PTD.

4. Includes indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation components.

5. The percentages for injury-years 2018 and 2019 are not shown because those statistics are not yet sufficiently stable.
Benefit duration

The average duration of total disability benefits rose significantly between 1999 and 2008, but has been stable since; the duration of TPD decreased between 1999 and 2010, but has been stable thereafter.

- Total disability duration averaged 11.1 weeks for 2016, 15% above 1999. Most of this increase had occurred by 2003 and all of it by 2009.
- TPD duration averaged 14.7 weeks for 2017, 9% below 1999; essentially all of this decrease had occurred by 2010.
- The increase in total disability duration in 2008 and beyond, in comparison with earlier years, suggests an effect from the Great Recession. However, TPD duration did not show any changes during the recession.

Weekly benefits

After adjusting for average wage growth, average weekly total disability and TPD benefits decreased between 1999 and 2018 or 2019.

- As compared with 1999, adjusted average weekly total disability benefits had fallen by 9% by 2019 and TPD benefits had fallen by 8% by 2018.
- For both benefit types, most or all of the decrease had occurred by 2008.

---

22 For 2006 to 2011, Minnesota’s annual average unemployment rate was (as a percentage, by year) 4.1, 4.7, 5.4, 8.0, 7.4 and 6.5; for the same years, total unemployment-insurance-covered employment was (in millions) 2.68, 2.69, 2.68, 2.57, 2.56 and 2.60. Data from the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (www.mn.gov/deed/data).

The limit on TTD duration was raised from 104 weeks to 130 weeks under a law change effective Oct. 1, 2008 (see Appendix B). DLI estimated this change would raise average TTD duration by 2.0%. Given that this provision took effect in the last quarter of 2008, this would have caused a 0.5% increase in duration from 2007 to 2008. This accounts for about 5% of the actual 10% increase in average total disability duration from 2007 to 2008.

Unadjusted average weekly benefits rose during the period examined, but less rapidly than the statewide average weekly wage, causing adjusted average weekly benefits to decline as shown here.

---

23 Unadjusted average weekly benefits rose during the period examined, but less rapidly than the statewide average weekly wage, causing adjusted average weekly benefits to decline as shown here.
Growth of average pre-injury wage in comparison with statewide average weekly wage

The pre-injury wage of injured workers is the primary basis for weekly wage-replacement benefits. Examining the trend in pre-injury wages relative to the statewide average weekly wage (SAWW) helps to understand the trends in adjusted average weekly benefits in Figure 3.4.

The average pre-injury wage of injured workers (APIW) rose more slowly than the SAWW from 1999 to 2019.

- While the SAWW rose 78% during this period, the APIW rose 64% (Figure 3.5).
- The APIW is less than the SAWW because paid claims are more common in lower-wage jobs.
- Because of its relatively slow rate of increase, the APIW fell from 85% of the SAWW in 1999 to 78% in 2019 (Figure 3.6).24
- Because average weekly benefits (Figure 3.4) are adjusted for growth in the SAWW, a change in the APIW relative to the SAWW will cause a change in these adjusted benefits, other things equal. The decrease in the APIW relative to the SAWW explains about 90% of the estimated decrease in adjusted average weekly benefits for total disability for 1999 through 2019 and 96% for TPD.25

---

24 The APIW has been declining relative to the SAWW at least since 1984, when the two were equal.
25 Because of year-to-year fluctuations in the data, three-year averages were used to calculate the percentage of the change in adjusted average weekly benefits due to the decrease in the APIW relative to the SAWW.
Average permanent partial disability rating

The trend in the average PPD rating helps to explain the trend in average PPD benefits in Figure 3.9. PPD ratings are reported for injured workers who receive PPD benefits and for some workers whose PPD benefits are determined and paid through the settlement process; however, PPD ratings are not reported for many workers with settlements. The average PPD rating has fallen since 1999.

- The average rating stood at 5.3% for injury-year 2019. This represents a 23% decrease from 1999.26
- By itself, a decrease in the average rating would decrease average PPD benefits because the PPD benefit is calculated as the rating times a statutorily specified benefit amount per rating point.27

Average level of permanent partial disability benefit schedule

The trend in average PPD benefits in Figure 3.9 is also partly explained by the trend in the level of the PPD benefit schedule. This benefit schedule is fixed in statute, but has been raised twice since 1998.

- The PPD benefit schedule was raised in 2000 by an estimated 14.1% and in 2018 by 5% (see note 1 in Figure 3.8).
- As a result of these changes, the benefit schedule was higher by an estimated 19.8% for injury-year 2019 than for injury-year 1999 (see note 1 in Figure 3.8).

---

26 See note 17 on p. 11.
27 The benefit amount per rating point increases with the size of the rating (Minn. Stat. §176.101, subd. 2a). As a result, a given percent decrease in the average rating will tend to produce a somewhat larger percent decrease in the average benefit as more claims are in lower brackets in the schedule with lower benefit amounts per rating point.
Average benefits by type

Settlement benefits are far higher, on average, (where they are paid) than total disability, TPD and PPD benefits (Figure 3.9). With respect to trends, after adjusting for average wage growth, average benefits of different types have moved in widely divergent ways.

- For injury-year 2016 (the most recent year with reliable developed data for all four benefit types shown), settlement benefits averaged about $48,600 per claim where they were paid. The other four benefit types shown averaged about $4,100 to $6,700.

- After adjusting for average wage growth:
  - average total disability benefits were largely stable from 1999 to 2016;
  - average TPD benefits fell 16% from 1999 to 2017;
  - average PPD benefits fell 50% from 1999 to 2019; and
  - average settlement benefits rose 14% from 1999 to 2016.

- The trends in average total disability and TPD benefits are driven by the trends in average benefit duration and average weekly benefits.
  - Average total disability benefits were largely stable between 1999 and 2016 because of opposing trends in duration and average weekly benefits (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
  - The slightly falling trend in average TPD benefits occurred because of slightly falling trends in both duration and average weekly benefits (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).

- Adjusted average PPD benefits fell nearly continually from 1999 to 2019. This occurred primarily because the statutory PPD benefit schedule changed only twice during that period with an overall combined increase of 19.8% (Figure 3.8). Under the mostly fixed schedule, PPD benefits become smaller relative to rising wages, which is reflected in falling adjusted average benefits.
  - As shown in Figure 3.7, the average PPD rating fell roughly 23% from 1999 to 2019. This would produce a decrease in the average PPD benefit (unadjusted for wage growth) of roughly the same percentage. The net effect of this decrease and the 19.8% increase in the benefit schedule (Figure 3.8) would be a predicted decrease in average unadjusted benefits of roughly 8%.

  - Actual average PPD benefits, unadjusted for average wage growth, fell during the period by 10%, about as expected from the preceding calculation.
  - This decrease is only a small fraction of the 50% decrease in average PPD benefits as adjusted for average wage growth shown in Figure 3.9. Again, this decrease represents the fall in unadjusted average PPD benefits relative to rising wages. Most of the decrease in the adjusted average benefit occurred because the average wage used to adjust the average benefits grew by 78% from 1999 to 2019.

- Settlement benefits depend in part on the value of benefits the claimant might receive without a settlement. When considering the trend in average settlement benefits, it should be borne in mind that these benefits include medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits in addition to total disability, TPD and PPD benefits.

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28 See note 17 on p. 11.
29 See second bullet on p. 22 and note 27 on that page.
30 (1 - .233 [the more exact decrease in the average rating]) x (1 + .198) = .919, or an 8.1% decrease. When the progressive nature of the PPD benefit schedule is considered, a given change in the average rating can be expected to produce a somewhat-more-than-proportionate change in the average PPD benefit.
31 Under current DLI protocols, insurers do not separate the indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation components of settlement awards in their reporting to DLI. Settlements rarely close out all medical benefits, but they often close out certain types of these benefits.
Figure 3.9  Average benefit by type per claim with that benefit type, adjusted for wage growth, injury-years 1999-2019 [1]

A. Four benefit types, injury-year 2016 [2]

B. Table of values

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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

C. Settlement benefits [4], injury-years 1999-2016 [5]

D. Total disability [3], TPD and PPD benefits, injury-years 1999-2019

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C). An indemnity claim may have more than one type of benefit paid. Benefit amounts are adjusted for average wage growth between the respective injury-year and 2019.
2. Injury year 2016 is shown here because it is the most recent year for which the values for all four benefit types are sufficiently stable (see Table of values and note 5).
3. Total disability includes TTD and PTD.
4. Includes indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation components.
5. The statistics for TPD for 2018 and 2019 and for total disability and settlement benefits for 2017, 2018 and 2019 are not shown because they are not yet sufficiently stable.
Benefits by type per indemnity claim

Per paid indemnity claim, settlement benefits are about twice as high as total disability benefits and far higher than TPD or PPD benefits (Figure 3.10). With respect to trends, after adjusting for average wage growth, average benefits per paid indemnity claim followed widely divergent paths.

Note: Figure 3.10 differs from Figure 3.9 in that it shows the average benefit of each type per paid indemnity claim, rather than per claim with that type of benefit. Figure 3.10 reflects the percentage of indemnity claims with each benefit type (Figure 3.2) and the average benefit amount per claim with that benefit type (Figure 3.9). For example, the $11,580 average settlement benefits per paid indemnity claim for 2016 (Figure 3.10, Panel A) is equal to the percentage of indemnity claims with settlement benefits (23.8%, Figure 3.2, Panel A) multiplied by the average settlement benefit where paid ($48,560, Figure 3.9, Panel A).

- For injury-year 2016 (the most recent year with reliable developed data for all four benefit types shown), settlement benefits averaged about $11,580 per paid indemnity claim. Total disability was less than half that amount at $5,510, and TPD and PPD were approximately $1,000.

- After adjusting for average wage growth:
  - total disability benefits per indemnity claim, after rising then falling from 1999 through 2004 (having risen as much as 15% by 2002), have remained stable since; total disability benefits per indemnity claim were about the same in 2016 as in 1999;
  - TPD benefits per indemnity claim fell 24% from 1999 to 2017;
  - PPD benefits per indemnity claim fell 62% from 1999 to 2018; and
  - settlement benefits per indemnity claim rose 56% from 1999 to 2016, with most of this increase occurring by 2009.

- The trend in total disability benefits per indemnity claim largely followed the trend in the average amount of these benefits where they were paid (Figure 3.9), given the flat trend in the proportion of indemnity claims with these benefits (Figure 3.2).

- The decline in TPD benefits per indemnity claim is attributable to declines in the percentage of indemnity claims with these benefits (Figure 3.2) and in adjusted average TPD benefits where these were paid (Figure 3.9).

- The decline in average PPD benefits per indemnity claim resulted primarily from a decrease in adjusted average PPD benefits where these were paid (Figure 3.9) and to a lesser degree from a decrease in the percentage of claims with these benefits (Figure 3.2).

- The increase in settlement benefits per indemnity claim resulted from an increase in the proportion of claims with these benefits (Figure 3.2) and an increase in adjusted average settlement benefits where they were paid (Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.10  Average benefit by type per paid indemnity claim, adjusted for wage growth, injury-years 1999-2018 [1]

A. Four benefit types, injury-year 2016 [2]

B. Table of values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>770</td>
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</table>

C. Total disability [3] and settlement benefits [4], injury-years 1999-2016

D. TPD and PPD benefits, injury-years 1999-2018

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C). An indemnity claim may have more than one type of benefit paid. Benefit amounts are adjusted for average wage growth between the respective injury-year and 2019.
2. Injury-year 2016 is shown here because it is the most recent year for which the values for all four benefit types are sufficiently stable (see Table of values and note 5).
3. Total disability includes TTD and PTD.
4. Includes indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation components.
5. The statistics for total disability and settlement benefits for 2017, 2018 and 2019, for TPD for 2018 and 2019, and for PPD for 2019 are not shown because they are not yet sufficiently stable.
Indemnity benefits per claim, DLI and MWCIA data

As computed from DLI and MWCIA data, indemnity benefits per claim from the two sources follow each other closely.

- From 1999 through 2016, the MWCIA figure has exceeded the DLI figure. This is largely because the MWCIA figure includes vocational rehabilitation benefits while the DLI figure does not. 32

- Both data sources show a generally stable trend in wage-adjusted indemnity benefits per indemnity claim since 2002, with some yearly fluctuations.

- It is uncertain why the MWCIA figure seems to fluctuate more than the DLI figure. One possible explanation is that the MWCIA figure is based on payments plus claim-specific reserves while the DLI figure is based on payments alone. 33

- The agreement between the data sources lends credibility to both.

---

32 As shown in Figure 4.3, the average cost of vocational rehabilitation has been somewhat above $2,000 per paid indemnity claim (adjusted for wage growth) since 2001. From 2001 to 2016, the MWCIA number in Figure 3.11 exceeded the DLI number by an average of $2,705.

Another possible factor is that the MWCIA figure excludes self-insured employers while the DLI figure includes them, although the effect of this difference is uncertain.

33 Claim-specific reserves are funds an insurer sets aside to cover anticipated future costs of particular claims.
Indemnity benefits per $100 of payroll, DLI and MWCIA data

As computed from DLI and MWCIA data, indemnity benefits per $100 of payroll from the two sources follow each other closely.

- Since 1999, the DLI figure has ranged from 85% to 94% of the MWCIA figure.

- As with average indemnity benefits per paid indemnity claim (Figure 3.11), much of the difference between the DLI and MWCIA numbers is because the MWCIA figure includes vocational rehabilitation service costs while the DLI number does not.\(^{34}\)

- Again, the general agreement between the data sources lends credibility to both.

---

\(^{34}\) The data in Figure 2.8 indicates the vocational rehabilitation (VR) component of total system cost is about 8.7% of the combined VR and indemnity (without VR) components (2.8% / (29.3% + 2.8%) = 8.7%). This accounts for a majority of the average 12.0% difference between the DLI and MWCIA numbers in Figure 3.12 for the period shown.

Another possible factor is that the MWCIA figure excludes self-insured employers while the DLI figure includes them, although the effect of this difference is uncertain.
Supplementary benefit and second-injury costs

DLI produces an annual projection of supplementary benefit and second-injury reimbursement costs as they would exist without future settlement activity. The total annual cost is projected to fall by 63% during the next 10 years and to disappear by 2060.

- The 2021 projected cost of $25 million consists of roughly $19 million for supplementary benefits and $6 million for second injuries.
- Without settlements, supplementary benefit claims are projected to continue until 2060 and second-injury claims until 2045.
- Claim settlements will reduce future projections of these liabilities. Settlements amounted to $2.0 million in fiscal-year 2020.
- The cost of supplementary and second-injury benefits for calendar year 2019, $37.4 million including settlements, came to 2.4% of total workers’ compensation system cost.\(^{35}\)

\(^{35}\) This percentage was calculated with techniques similar to those for Figure 2.8 to reduce the effects of annual fluctuations in total system cost.

---

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year of claim receipt</th>
<th>Projected amount claimed ($millions)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
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1. Projected from DLI data, assuming no future settlement activity. See Appendix A for definitions.
State agency administrative cost

State agency administrative cost paid out of the workers’ compensation assessment has fallen as a proportion of workers’ compensation covered payroll during the past several years.

- In fiscal-year 2020, state agency administrative cost (see note 1 in Figure 3.14) was 2.3 cents per $100 of payroll.

- The main factor in the decline of administrative cost relative to covered payroll over time has been the steady increase in payroll itself, as administrative cost has been relatively stable during the past two decades.

- The increase in administrative cost in 2019 and 2020 primarily reflected the beginning of substantial expenditure for the Workers’ Compensation Modernization Program, or Campus.36

- Administrative cost for 2020 was $37.4 million. As indicated in Figure 2.8, state administration accounted for about 2.3% of total workers’ compensation system cost in 2019.

### Figure 3.14 Net state agency administrative cost per $100 of workers’ compensation covered payroll, fiscal-years 1999-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Fiscal year</th>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI, MWCA and the Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association. Includes costs of workers’ compensation administrative functions in DLI, the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals and the Department of Commerce, as well as the state share of the cost of Minnesota’s OSHA program, beyond what is paid from revenues other than the Special Compensation Fund assessment. Estimated as described in Appendix C.

36 “Campus” stands for “Claims Access and Management Platform User System.” Campus expenditures, funded by the workers’ compensation assessment, were $3.6 million in 2019 and $7.8 million in 2020, as compared with $0.2 million in 2018. The Legislature has authorized a total of $19 million in Campus development expenditures.
Special Compensation Fund assessment rate

The Special Compensation Fund assessment rate has fallen by half since 1999.

- The rate fell from 30.0% for 1999 to 13.7% for 2021. Primarily, this reflects the continuing decreases in supplementary benefit and second-injury reimbursement costs (Figure 3.13) and, to a lesser degree, the decreasing trend in state agency administrative costs relative to total covered payroll (Figure 3.14).

- The sharp decrease in the assessment rate for fiscal year 2019 primarily reflects an increase in the reported assessment base rather than a decrease in the assessment itself. The increase in the base reflects some insurers erroneously including medical benefits in their reported base, which is supposed to include paid indemnity benefits only.37

- The fluctuations of the assessment rate between 20% and 30% from 1999 to 2003 reflected DLI responses to legislative actions.38

- At its highest, the assessment rate was 31% for fiscal-years 1988 through 1992 (before the period shown in Figure 3.15).

---

37 Through payment-year 2016, DLI required insurers to report paid medical benefits as a separate item in the annual “Workers’ Compensation Report of Benefits Paid.” Beginning with payment-year 2017, DLI dropped medical benefits from the report; however, some insurers erroneously added these benefits to their reported paid indemnity benefits. Between the two payment-years, reported indemnity increased by 17.8%. This contributed the majority of the 23.8% decrease in the nominal assessment rate for assessments due in fiscal-year 2019. The remainder of the decrease resulted from a drop of 10.3% in assessment liabilities between the two years.

38 The 2000 Legislature transferred $325 million of surplus from the Assigned Risk Plan to the Special Compensation Fund for the purpose of settling liabilities of the supplementary benefit and second-injury programs. The legislative action also mandated a decrease in the assessment rate by Jan. 1, 2001, of at least 30% from the rate in effect on Jan. 1, 2000 (Minn. Laws 2000, ch. 447, secs. 24-27) (see note 2 in Figure 3.15). DLI reduced the rate from 30% to 20% effective July 1, 2000, for assessments due in the second half of fiscal year 2001. The 2002 Legislature directed that the remaining balance of the transferred amount be transferred to the state general fund as of July 1, 2003. The transferred amount was $265 million. DLI raised the assessment rate to 30% for assessments due in fiscal-year 2003.
Vocational rehabilitation

This chapter provides data about vocational rehabilitation (VR) services in Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system. Some of the statistics are presented by the year of the worker’s injury or illness; others are presented by the year of the VR plan closure. VR plan-closure years cover the period from Oct. 1 through Sept. 30 of the indicated year. The economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic affected results for many 2019 claims and for 2020 closures.

**Major findings**

- Participation in vocational rehabilitation rose from 17% of paid indemnity claims for injury-year 1999 to 23% for 2019 (Figure 4.1).

- After adjusting for average wage growth, the average cost of VR services for injury-year 2019 ($8,750) was 22% below the 2007 peak ($11,250) (Figure 4.3).

- VR services accounted for an estimated 2.8% of total workers’ compensation system cost for 2019 (Figure 2.8).

- The average time from injury to the start of VR services fell from 8.6 months for injury-year 1999 to 5.1 months for injury-year 2019 (Figure 4.5).

- The percentage of VR plans closed with a plan completion fell from 55% for plans closed in 2005 to 46% for 2020; during the same period, the percentage of closures resulting from claim settlement or agreement of the parties increased from 43% to 50%. The decrease in plan completions took place between 2005 and 2010; the plan-completion rate has remained at 46% or higher since 2011 (Figure 4.7).

- The percentage of VR participants with a job reported at plan closure fell from 66% for plan-closure year 2005 to 56% for 2020 (Figure 4.9). Much of the decrease is because of the decrease in closures with completed plans (Figure 4.7).

- During the 2018 through 2020 closure years, 68% of the workers returned to a wage at least 96% of their pre-injury wage (Figure 4.11).

- For VR participants who returned to work at a different employer in 2020, the average ratio of the return-to-work wage to the pre-injury wage was 91%, an increase from 71% in 2009. For workers returning to the same employer, the average ratio was 97%, which has not significantly changed since 2005 (Figure 4.12).

**Background**

The following basic information is necessary for understanding the figures in this chapter. See the glossary in Appendix A for more detail.

Vocational rehabilitation is the third type of workers’ compensation benefit, supplementing indemnity and medical benefits. VR services are provided to injured workers who need help in returning to suitable gainful employment because of their injuries.39

VR services include the following:

- medical management;
- coordination of return to the pre-injury job;
- job modification;
- job-seeking skills training;
- job development;

39 Minnesota Statutes § 176.102, subdivision 1(b), and Minnesota Rules, part 5220.0100, subpart 34.
These services are delivered or facilitated by qualified rehabilitation consultants (QRCs) and registered placement vendors. These providers are registered with Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) and must follow professional conduct standards specified in Minnesota Rules. QRCs determine worker eligibility for VR services, develop VR plans for those determined eligible and coordinate service delivery under those plans.

QRCs work mostly in private-sector VR firms and may also provide services to non-workers’ compensation clients. Some VR firms also have job-placement staff. DLI’s Vocational Rehabilitation unit (VRU) provides VR services primarily to injured workers whose claims are involved in primary liability or causation disputes; it may also provide services in non-contested cases.

Registered placement vendors are approved to provide job-development and job-placement services under an approved VR plan. They help injured workers to secure suitable employment through a series of activities, including teaching job-seeking skills and assisting with preparation of resumes, cover letters and job applications. Placement vendors also contact prospective employers to identify jobs, arrange interviews, discuss employment incentives and conduct labor market surveys.

The VR eligibility process begins when the insurer files a disability status report (DSR) to notify DLI it is referring the injured worker to a QRC for a VR consultation or requesting a waiver of VR services. The insurer must file the DSR within 14 days of becoming aware that temporary total disability is likely to exceed 13 weeks, 90 days after the injury if the employee has not returned to work or 14 days after receiving a consultation request from the employee.

A QRC has a consultation with the employee if the insurer has referred the employee for one via the DSR or if, before or after the DSR, the employee or employer requests a consultation or DLI orders one. A QRC in DLI’s VRU may also provide a consultation if the insurer denies that the employee’s injury or condition is work-related. If the QRC determines through the consultation that the employee is qualified for VR services, a VR plan is then developed.

VR plan costs reported to DLI include charges for services by QRCs and vendors and direct costs of certain other services, such as vocational testing. VR plan costs also include the costs of planning and facilitating other services, such as functional capacity evaluations, technical or academic skills improvement, retraining and on-the-job training. The direct costs of these other services, such as tuition, are paid directly by the insurer and are not reported as a plan cost to DLI.

Annual changes in hourly VR service charges through 2012 were limited to the lesser of the percentage increase in the statewide average weekly wage (SAWW) or 2%. The 2013 workers’ compensation law change increased the annual change in hourly charges to the lesser of the percentage increase in the SAWW or 3%, effective Oct. 1, 2013.

The 2013 law change also defined job-development services and limited these services to 20 hours a month for up to 13 weeks, or 26 weeks by agreement between the injured worker and employer or by order of DLI or the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). This limit is effective for employees injured on or after Oct. 1, 2013. Neither DLI nor OAH can order more than 26 weeks of job-development services, although the parties can agree to additional weeks. Injured workers with earlier dates of injury have no limit on their job-development services.

Rule amendments effective Sept. 24, 2018, eliminated the $10 an hour fee reduction for lengthy and costly VR plans and adjusted the hourly rate to maintain cost neutrality. The rule change also increased the limit on payment to QRCs for their services during job development and job placement to six hours a month.

The maximum hourly fee levels for QRCs and for job-development and job-placement services, effective Oct. 1, 2019, through Sept. 30, 2020, were $109.38 and $87.61, respectively. These
rates changed to $112.53 and $90.13, respectively, for Oct. 1, 2020, through Sept. 30, 2021.

**Data sources and time period covered**

The data in this chapter comes from VR documents filed with DLI for claims with VR activity. Injured workers may receive services from multiple VR service providers (at different times), each of which may file VR plans. The duration and cost of VR services reported in this chapter are the cumulative values from all plans involved with a particular claim. For brevity, combined plans are referred to simply as plans. The service outcomes are the outcomes of the most recent plan closure.

The trend statistics in this chapter reported by injury-year or plan-closure year are developed (projected) to a uniform maturity as described in Appendix C. VR plan-closure years cover the period from Oct. 1 through Sept. 30 of the indicated year.
Participation

The VR participation rate increased during the past 20 years, but appears to have leveled off in the past 10 years.

- The VR participation rate — the percentage of paid indemnity claims with a VR plan filed — increased from 16% in 1998 to 23% in 2008, and it has remained in the 23% to 25% range.

- A projected 5,200 of the estimated 22,200 workers with indemnity claims for injury-year 2019 are expected to receive VR services.

- Examination of receipt of VR services by occupation shows that, for workers with injuries from 2015 through 2019, VR participation ranged from 17% for workers in management, professional, service and sales occupations to 26% for workers in construction and extraction occupations.

Participation and injury severity

VR participation increases with injury severity, as measured by the amount of time the injured worker has been off the job and by the worker’s degree of permanent partial disability (PPD).

- For workers with indemnity claims closed between October 2017 and September 2020:
  - VR participation ranged from 12% for workers with no more than three months of TTD benefits to 96% for workers with more than 12 months of these benefits; and
  - VR participation ranged from 13% for workers without PPD benefits (and no settlement agreement) to 83% for workers with PPD ratings of 20% or more (no figure shown). VR participation was 48% for workers with a settlement and no PPD benefits.

---

Figure 4.1 Percentage of paid indemnity claims with a VR plan filed, injury-years 1999-2019 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage with plan filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C).

---

Figure 4.2 Percentage of paid indemnity claims with a VR plan filed by TTD duration, claim-closure years 2018-2020 combined [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of TTD benefits</th>
<th>Percentage with plan filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 3 months</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 months</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12 months</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 12 mos.</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. Statistics by claim-closure year exclude injuries prior to 1998. Claim-closure years start in October and end in September of the indicated year.

---

40 Workers with a settlement are excluded from the group without PPD benefits because the settlement might have included consideration for PPD. Some of the workers with a PPD benefit may also have received a settlement that included consideration for additional PPD.
Cost

Adjusted for average wage growth, the average cost of VR services peaked in 2007 but has fallen since then.41

- The adjusted average cost of $8,750 for 2019 was slightly above the average cost for the previous two years but 22% below the 2007 peak of $11,250.

- The adjusted median cost peaked in 2008. The median service costs have remained near $6,000 since 2010.

- The total cost of VR services for injury-year 2018 is estimated at $46 million. As shown in Figure 2.8, VR accounts for an estimated 2.8% of total workers’ compensation system cost for payment year 2019.

- Average VR service cost per indemnity claim (counting claims with and without plans) was $2,050 for 2019. This trend has been largely flat since 2002. It reflects the trends in the participation rate (Figure 4.1) and average service cost (Figure 4.3).

- For plans closed in 2020, 93% of total VR cost was for QRC services and 7% was vendor placement services. Job development and placement services accounted for 9% of total service costs (4% by QRC firms and 5% by vendors).

Cost and injury severity

VR service costs increase with injury severity as measured by PPD rating, reflecting an increased amount of services.

- For plan-closure years 2018 to 2020, participants with higher PPD ratings had progressively higher VR costs. For workers with PPD ratings of 15% or more, the average cost of VR services was more than double the cost for workers with PPD ratings of 5% or less.

- For workers with a settlement but no PPD rating, their average VR service costs were $10,000.

41 The VR service costs indicated here are those reported by QRCs to DLI on the plan-closure form. These costs do not always represent the amounts actually paid (see p. 34).

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Figure 4.3  VR service costs, adjusted for wage growth, injury-years 1999-2019 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average cost</th>
<th>Median cost</th>
<th>Cost per indemnity claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$9,480</td>
<td>$5,400</td>
<td>$1,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$11,250</td>
<td>$6,490</td>
<td>$2,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$10,140</td>
<td>$6,220</td>
<td>$2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$9,010</td>
<td>$5,780</td>
<td>$2,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$8,750</td>
<td>$5,680</td>
<td>$2,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from DLI data. Costs are adjusted for average wage growth between the respective year and 2019.

Figure 4.4  VR service cost by PPD rating, adjusted for wage growth, plan-closure years 2018-2020 combined [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPD rating</th>
<th>Average cost</th>
<th>Median cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No PPD [2]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. Costs are adjusted for average wage growth between the year of injury and 2019. Plan-closure years start in October and end in September of the indicated year.
2. Workers with a settlement are excluded from the group without PPD benefits because the settlement might have included consideration for PPD.
3. Some of the workers with a PPD benefit may also have received a settlement that included consideration for additional PPD. The upper range of each category extends to all values up to the next category’s start value.
Timing of services

Prompt service provision is closely linked to successful VR outcomes. The average time from injury to the start of VR services has decreased by more than three months since 1999 and two months since 2005.

- The average time to the start of VR services was 5.1 months for injury-year 2019, down 41% from 1999; the median time was 2.9 months for 2019, down 35% from 1999.

- The time to the start of services seems to have leveled off since 2016.

- Among plans closed in 2020, 47% of VR starts were within three months of injury and 75% were within six months.

- Among VR participants with plans closed in 2020, those who began services within three months of injury, as compared to those starting more than a year after their injury, had:
  - 15% lower average VR service costs ($8,810 versus $10,320);
  - 13% shorter average service durations (12.1 months versus 13.9 months); and
  - Slightly better chances of returning to work at plan closure (58% versus 55%).

Service duration

VR service duration — measured by the time between the initial consultation and plan closure — has increased and then fallen since 2005.

- The average service duration has steadily decreased since 2012; median durations have remained near nine months since 2014. The 2020 mean of 12.2 months was the lowest value in the 2005 through 2020 plan-closure period.

- The relatively high average service durations for 2008 through 2013 suggest an effect of the Great Recession.

- Among plans closed in 2020, average service duration was 9.3 months for participants who returned to work with their pre-injury employer; 16.6 months for those who went to a different employer; and 14.1 months for workers who had their plans closed without a recorded return to work.

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### Figure 4.5 Time from injury to start of VR services, injury-years 1999-2019 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury year</th>
<th>Average months</th>
<th>Median months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C).

### Figure 4.6 VR service duration, plan-closure years 2005-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan-closure year</th>
<th>Average months</th>
<th>Median months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from DLI data. The statistics by plan-closure year begin with 2005 to allow the data concerned, which begins with injury-year 1998, to be sufficiently mature. Plan-closure years start in October and end in September of the indicated year. See Appendix C.
Reason for plan closure

While the trends for plan closure reasons have been largely stable since 2011, results for completions in 2020 indicate possible effects of the economic disruption caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Workers may have experienced difficulty finding suitable employment and also may have been more willing to seek a settled agreement to their claims.

- The proportion of plans closed with completion of services reached 50% in 2019, but dropped back to 46% in 2020. (Figure 4.7).

- The proportion of plans closed by claim settlement has varied between 30% and 32% since 2009. The percentage rose from 30% in 2019 to 32% in 2020.

- The increased proportion of VR plans closed because of claim settlement is consistent with the increase in the percentage of paid indemnity claims with settlements (Figure 3.2).

- The proportion of plans closed by agreement of the parties remained in range of 17% to 18% for 2012 to 2018, then dipped to 16% in 2019 before increasing to nearly 19% in 2020.

- A return to work is reported for most participants who complete their plans (96% for 2020) but for only a minority of those who do not (whose plans close for any other reason) (21%). More than one possible reason exists for this connection between reported plan completion and return to work.42

- Plan costs vary by reason for closure (Figure 4.8). For 2020 closures, the highest average plan costs were for plans closed with a settlement ($11,550) and the lowest were for completed plans ($6,400). This variation occurs mainly because of differences in the type and duration of services provided.43

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42 Completing a plan may lead to job placement, or job placement may lead the QRC to deem the plan completed. Also, employment may be less likely to be reported if a plan closes for reasons other than completion (e.g., claim settlement or agreement of the parties).

43 This is shown by separate DLI analysis.
Return-to-work status

The goal of VR is to return injured workers to suitable gainful employment. Returning to work is affected by many factors, including VR services, the job market, injury severity, worker job skills and education, availability of job modifications and claim litigation. Probably as a result of the economic conditions in 2020, the estimated percentage of VR participants with a job reported at plan closure was lower in 2020 than any year since 2010.44

- The percentage of VR participants with a job reported at plan closure fell from 61% in 2019 to 56% in 2020. There were similar decreases in workers returning to the same employer and to a different employer.

- The percentage of participants with a job reported at plan closure closely parallels the percentage of plans closed because of completion (Figure 4.7). This is expected since a job is reported at closure for almost all who complete their plans but for only a minority of others. Again, there is more than one possible reason for the correlation between plan completion and having a job reported at plan closure.45

- For plan closures in 2020, the average cost of VR services for participants returning to work with their pre-injury employer ($6,080) was less than half the cost of workers going to a different employer ($13,460) and less than the service cost for workers not returning to work at plan closure ($10,370).

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44 The term “reported” is used to emphasize that the available information about whether the VR participant has a job at plan closure is what the QRC reports to DLI. Especially where the plan closes for reasons other than completion (for example, claim settlement), the participant may have a job without this being known and reported by the QRC. Also, employment status changes over time.

45 See note 42.
Return-to-work status and plan duration

The percentage of VR participants with a reported return to work decreases with plan duration.

- For plan closures in 2018 to 2020 combined, the percentage of workers returning to work ranged from 70% for plans lasting no more than six months to 49% for plans lasting 24 months or more.

- The percentage of workers returning to their pre-injury employer was 58% for the shortest plans and 22% for the longest plans.

- The percentage of workers finding a job with a different employer was 12% for the shortest plans and 27% for the longest plans.

Return-to-work wages: distribution

For VR participants returning to work, the return-to-work wage, on average, is slightly less than the pre-injury wage, but this varies widely.

- For plan closures in 2018 to 2020 combined, 68% of VR participants returning to work earned more than 95% of their pre-injury wage, but 20% earned less than 80% of their pre-injury wage.

- Return-to-work wage recovery was related to injury severity as measured by PPD rating. For plan closures in 2018 to 2020 combined, workers without a PPD payment or a settlement agreement had an average wage ratio of 98% of their pre-injury wage, while workers with PPD ratings of 20% or higher who returned to work had an average wage ratio of 89%.

- Average return-to-work wage rates also vary with plan duration. For 2018 to 2020 closures, the average return-to-work wage ratio was 97% for VR plans of fewer than 12 months of duration, 94% for plans between 12 and 18 months, and 88% for plans with longer service durations.

1. Data from DLI. 2. Plan-closure years start in October and end in September of the indicated year.
Return-to-work wages: trend

Among VR participants returning to work at plan completion, the ratio of the return-to-work wage to the pre-injury wage changed little between 2005 and 2020 for those returning to their pre-injury employer. For workers going to a different employer, the ratio declined in 2008 and 2009 but recovered in later years, reaching new high values in 2017 and continuing through 2019.

- For workers returning to their pre-injury employer, the average wage ratio was between 96% and 98% from 2005 to 2020.
- For workers going to a different employer, the wage ratio stood at 90% for closures in 2020; this was 12 percentage points higher than in 2005 and 19 percentage points higher than the low-point of 71% reached in 2009.
- The dip in the wage ratio for 2008 to 2011 for those going to a different employer suggests an effect of the Great Recession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan-closure year</th>
<th>Same employer</th>
<th>Different employer</th>
<th>Total with job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed statistics from DLI data. The statistics by plan-closure year begin with 2005 to allow the data concerned, which begins with injury year 1998, to be sufficiently mature. Years start in October and end in September of the year number. See Appendix C.
5 Disputes and DLI dispute resolution

This chapter presents data concerning workers’ compensation disputes and DLI dispute resolution. Workers’ Compensation System Reports through 2016 also included data about dispute resolution at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). In March 2018, OAH implemented a new court case-management system (C-Track). DLI implemented a new workers’ compensation data system (Campus) in November 2020. These systems replace the one DLI and OAH had previously shared. Because of the separate systems, this report, like last year’s, excludes data concerning OAH dispute-resolution activities. As DLI and OAH work together to enhance data-sharing between the two new systems, future Workers’ Compensation System Reports may also include OAH dispute-resolution statistics.

The Campus implementation has required a new system of reporting, tracking and coding dispute-related information and calculating dispute statistics. This year’s report reflects the changes during this period of transition, resulting in some discontinuities in the statistics.

Some statistics in this chapter are by year of injury; these are “developed” statistics, which in some instances are not yet sufficiently stable for publication for recent years. Statistics about dispute-resolution timelines are by the year the dispute was filed; sometimes these statistics are not given for the most recent years, to allow enough time for the resolution process to play out. Some statistics are by the year an action occurred and are presented through 2020.

Major findings

- The overall dispute rate showed a large increase from 1999 to 2008, but has leveled off since 2008. The rates of particular types of disputes have followed a similar pattern. For injury-year 2017, the rates of discontinuance disputes, medical disputes and rehabilitation disputes were projected to be at their lowest levels since at least 2013 (Figure 5.1).

- Claimant attorney involvement has increased substantially since 1999. The percentage of paid indemnity claims with a claimant attorney rose from 17% for injury-year 1999 to a projected 24% for injury-year 2017, a 39% increase (Figure 5.2).

- Total claimant attorney fees are estimated at $51 million for injury-year 2017. On a paid basis, claimant attorney fees accounted for an estimated 3.3% of total workers’ compensation system cost for 2019.

- The rate of denial of filed indemnity claims was 13.9% for 2019. This was substantially above the rates of 12.3% to 12.5% for 2007 through 2011. This increase is accounted for by an increase in claims denied and without payment, as opposed to claims denied but with payment (Figure 5.3).

- At the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI):
  - Between 1999 and 2020, the certification rate for medical and vocational rehabilitation disputes combined dropped

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47 “Campus” stands for “Claims Access and Management Platform User System.”
49 A claimant attorney is deemed to be involved if there are claimant attorney fees of any type.
50 See note 17 on p. 11.
51 This figure counts all types of attorney fees.
Background

The following basic information is necessary for understanding the figures in this chapter. See the glossary in Appendix A for more detail.

Types of disputes

Most disputes in Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system concern one or more of the three types of benefits and services the system provides: monetary benefits; medical services; and vocational rehabilitation services.

The injured worker and the insurer may disagree about whether the benefit or service should be provided, the level at which it should be provided or how long it should continue. Often the disagreement is about whether the worker’s claimed injury, medical condition or disability is work-related (see “primary liability” and “causation” in Appendix A). Disputes may also occur about payment for a service already provided. Payment disputes typically involve a medical or vocational rehabilitation provider and the insurer, and may also involve the injured worker.

These disputes are typically filed by the injured worker and dealt with by DLI and OAH in the following ways.

Claim petition disputes — Disputes about primary liability and monetary benefit issues are typically filed on a claim petition, which triggers a formal hearing or settlement conference at OAH. Some medical and vocational rehabilitation disputes are also filed on claim petitions.

Discontinuance disputes — Disputes about the discontinuance of wage-loss benefits. They are most often initiated when the claimant requests an administrative conference (usually by phone) in response to the insurer’s declared intention to discontinue temporary total or temporary partial benefits. These disputes may also be presented on the Employee’s Objection to Discontinuance form or the insurer’s petition to discontinue benefits, either of which leads to a hearing at OAH.

Medical request disputes — These disputes are usually filed on a Medical Request form, which...
triggers an administrative conference at DLI or OAH if DLI certifies the dispute.

Rehabilitation request disputes — These disputes are usually filed on a Rehabilitation Request form, which leads to an administrative conference at DLI (or in some circumstances OAH) if DLI certifies the dispute.

Disputes also occur about other types of issues, such as attorney fees and the apportionment of liability among different employers, insurers and other payers (including the Special Compensation Fund).

Dispute resolution

Depending on the nature of the dispute, the form on which it is filed and the wishes of the parties, dispute resolution may be facilitated by a dispute-resolution specialist at DLI or by a judge at OAH. Administrative decisions from DLI or OAH can be appealed by requesting a de novo hearing at OAH; decisions from an OAH hearing can be appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals and then to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Dispute resolution at DLI

DLI carries out a variety of dispute-resolution activities.

Informal intervention — Through informal intervention, DLI provides information and assistance to the claim parties and communicates with them attempt to resolve potential and actual disputes at an early stage and to determine whether a dispute should be certified (see below). Informal intervention is often initiated when a party, usually a claimant, medical provider or vocational rehabilitation provider, contacts DLI because they have had difficulty obtaining a workers’ compensation benefit or service or payment for it. Resolution through informal intervention may occur before, during or after the dispute-certification process.

Dispute certification — In a medical or vocational rehabilitation dispute, DLI must certify that a dispute exists and that informal intervention did not resolve the dispute before an attorney may charge for services. The certification process is triggered by either a certification request or a medical or rehabilitation request. DLI specialists attempt to resolve the dispute informally during the certification process.

Mediation — If the parties agree to participate, a DLI specialist conducts a mediation to seek agreement about the issues. Any type of dispute is eligible. A DLI mediation agreement is usually incorporated into a stipulation for settlement and submitted to OAH for approval via an award on stipulation; occasionally the mediation agreement is recorded in a “mediation award” issued by DLI.

Administrative conference — DLI conducts administrative conferences about medical or vocational rehabilitation (VR) issues presented on a medical or rehabilitation request unless it has referred the issues to OAH or the issues have otherwise been resolved. DLI refers medical disputes other than those about fee levels to OAH if they involve more than $7,500 at the time of dispute filing, and it may refer medical or VR disputes for other reasons. The DLI specialist usually attempts to bring the parties to agreement during the conference. If agreement is reached, the specialist issues an “order on agreement.” If agreement is not reached, the specialist issues a “decision-and-order.” A party may appeal a DLI decision-and-order or order on agreement by requesting a de novo hearing at OAH.

Dispute resolution at OAH

OAH performs the following dispute-resolution activities.

Mediation — If the parties agree to participate, OAH offers mediation to seek agreement on the issues. Any type of dispute is eligible. An OAH mediation agreement is usually recorded in a stipulation for settlement and submitted to an

53 Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subdivision 1(c).

54 Minn. Stat. § 176.106. In 2005, the Legislature increased the monetary limit on DLI jurisdiction in medical disputes from $1,500 to $7,500. In 2013, the Legislature removed this limit for disputes about medical fees, effective May 17, 2013. Also, DLI usually refers medical disputes to OAH if surgery is involved, and it may refer medical or VR disputes if litigation is pending at OAH or the issues are unusually complex. Primary liability disputes are outside of administrative conference jurisdiction and must be filed on a claim petition, which leads to a settlement conference or hearing at OAH.
OAH judge for approval via an award on stipulation, but the agreement is sometimes recorded in a “mediation award” issued by an OAH judge.

Settlement conference — OAH conducts settlement conferences in litigated cases to achieve a negotiated settlement, where possible, without a formal hearing. If achieved, the settlement typically takes the form of a stipulation for settlement. A stipulation for settlement is approved by an OAH judge; it may be incorporated into a mediation award or “award on stipulation,” usually the latter.

Administrative conference — With some exceptions, OAH conducts administrative conferences about issues presented on a medical or rehabilitation request that have been referred from DLI (see above). In some cases, medical and rehabilitation request disputes referred from DLI are heard in a formal hearing (see below). OAH also conducts administrative conferences where requested by the claimant in a dispute about discontinuance of wage-loss benefits. If agreement is not reached at the conference, the OAH judge issues a decision-and-order. A party may appeal an OAH decision-and-order by requesting a de novo formal hearing at OAH.

Formal hearing — OAH conducts formal hearings about disputes presented on claim petitions and other petitions where resolution through a settlement conference is not possible. OAH also conducts hearings about other issues, such as: medical request disputes involving surgery; medical or rehabilitation request disputes that have complex legal issues or have been joined with other disputes by an order for consolidation; discontinuance disputes where the parties have requested a hearing; and disputes about miscellaneous issues, such as attorney fees. OAH also conducts de novo hearings when a party files a request for hearing to appeal an administrative-conference decision-and-order from DLI or OAH. If the parties do not reach agreement, the judge issues a “findings-and-order.”

Dispute resolution by the parties

Often the parties in a dispute reach agreement outside of the dispute-resolution process at DLI or OAH, although this is often spurred by DLI or OAH initiatives, such as the scheduling of proceedings. Sometimes the party initiating a dispute or an appeal of a decision-and-order withdraws the dispute or the appeal. Sometimes the parties agree informally, sometimes without notifying DLI or OAH. Disputes often settle by means of a stipulation for settlement, which may be reached while the dispute is at DLI or OAH. The stipulation for settlement is usually incorporated into an award on stipulation issued by an OAH judge. An award on stipulation may occur in any type of dispute, but occurs most commonly in claim petition disputes.

Dispute resolution in the Union Construction Workers’ Compensation Program

The 1995 workers’ compensation law change authorized employers and employees, through collective bargaining agreements, to establish certain obligations and procedures relating to workers’ compensation in their workplaces. These obligations and procedures may include (among others) alternative dispute resolution. If a collective bargaining agreement meets conditions in the law, the agreement must be recognized as valid and binding by DLI, OAH, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) and the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Union Construction Workers’ Compensation Program (UCWCP) was created under this process and has been operating since 1997; it includes alternative dispute resolution as one of its features.

The UCWCP aims to provide efficient and non-adversarial dispute resolution, quality medical and rehabilitative care, prompt payment of appropriate indemnity benefits and prompt and safe return to union work, with the goal of minimizing losses for employers and employees.

The UCWCP dispute-resolution process features four steps: intervention, facilitation, mediation and arbitration. An arbitrator’s decision is binding but may be appealed to the WCCA. Other features of UCWCP are an exclusive medical provider network, an exclusive rehabilitation consultant network and a neutral medical examiner panel.

55 Minn. Stat. § 176.239.
56 Minn. Stat. § 176.1812.
57 The indemnity benefits provided must be those in Minnesota law.
For 2014 to 2018, an annual average of 291 paid indemnity claims were involved in UCWCP. This accounted for about 13% of all paid indemnity claims in the construction industry for that period.\(^5\)

\(^5\) More information is available at www.ucwcp.com.
Dispute rates

The overall dispute rate showed a large increase from 1999 to 2008 but has leveled off since 2008. The rates of particular types of disputes have followed a similar pattern. The rates for overall disputes, claim petitions and discontinuance disputes are not updated from last year’s report.

- The overall dispute rate (the percentage of filed indemnity claims with any dispute) was 20.9% for 2016.\(^{59}\)

- Among rates of particular types of disputes, the claim petition rate was highest, at 15.7% for 2016.

- All dispute rates showed substantial increases between 1999 and 2008:
  - the overall dispute rate rose 5.0 percentage points (32%);\(^{60}\)
  - the rate of claim petitions rose 3.4 percentage points (30%);
  - the rate of discontinuance disputes rose 1.9 points (30%);
  - the rate of medical disputes rose 3.1 points (65%); and
  - the rate of rehabilitation disputes rose 1.7 points (41%).

- The claim petition rate is the only one that increased after 2008; between that year and 2016, it rose another 1.0 percentage point.

---

\(^{59}\) Data entry for dispute information was reorganized in 2020, resulting in an inability to develop some statistics for some dispute types. See also note 2 in Figure 5.1.

\(^{60}\) See note 17 on p. 11.
Claimant attorney involvement

Claimant attorney involvement has increased substantially since 1999. The percentage of claims with claimant attorney involvement has followed the percentage of claims with settlements and to a lesser degree the percentage with disputes.

- The percentage of paid indemnity claims with claimant attorney involvement rose from 17.0% for injury-year 1999 to a projected 23.6% for 2017.\(^6\)
- The rate of increase of claimant attorney involvement decreased since 2009.
- The rate of claimant attorney involvement followed a nearly identical trend to the percentage of claims with settlements,\(^6\) and exceeded the overall dispute rate for the entire period shown.\(^6\)

- While the rate of claimant attorney involvement rose with the dispute rate through 2008, it continued rising after that time while the dispute rate leveled off.
- Total claimant attorney fees are projected to be $51 million for injury-year 2017.\(^4\) On a paid basis, claimant attorney fees accounted for an estimated 3.3% of total workers’ compensation system cost for 2019.\(^5\)

DLI does not track defense attorney involvement; however, outside data indicates that among Minnesota claims from 2017 with at least seven days of disability at three years maturity, defense attorney involvement was 28%.\(^6\)

Figure 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury year</th>
<th>With claimant attorney</th>
<th>With any dispute</th>
<th>With settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Statistics after 2017 are not shown because they are not yet sufficiently stable for those years.
2. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C). A claimant attorney is deemed to be involved if claimant attorney fees of any type are reported. This percentage is relative to the number of paid indemnity claims.
3. From Figure 5.1. This percentage is relative to the number of filed indemnity claims. This statistic is from last year’s report because an update is unavailable.
4. From Figure 3.2. This percentage is relative to the number of paid indemnity claims.

---

\(^6^1\) See note 1 in Figure 5.2.
\(^6^2\) Some claims have claimant attorney involvement without a settlement and vice-versa. Among paid indemnity claims that closed from 2015-2017, 1.7% had claimant attorney involvement without a settlement and 1.1% had a settlement without claimant attorney involvement.
\(^6^3\) Among paid indemnity claims that closed from 2014 through 2016, 5.5% had claimant attorney involvement without a dispute and 2.0% had a dispute without claimant attorney involvement.
\(^6^4\) This figure counts all types of claimant attorney fees. The figure is given for injury-year 2017 because the estimates for 2018 and 2019 are not yet sufficiently stable.
\(^6^5\) This percentage was calculated with techniques similar to those for Figure 2.8 to reduce the effects of annual fluctuations in total system cost.
\(^6^6\) Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI), CompScope benchmarks for Minnesota, 21st edition, April 2021, p. 26. In contrast with the WCRI data, the DLI data in Figure 5.2 pertains generally to claims with three or more days of disability developed to essentially full maturity.
Claim denials

Denials of primary liability are of interest because they frequently generate disputes. The denial rate has varied widely since 1999.

- The rate of denial of filed indemnity claims stood at 13.9% for 2019, in a decreasing trend from the high-point of 16.9% for 2015. The years 2014 through 2016 were about as high as the previous high years of 2003 and 2004, and substantially above the low period of 2007 through 2011.

- The changes in the overall denial rate since 2011 are virtually all accounted for by changes in claims denied and without payment, as opposed to claims denied but with payment.67

  ➢ From 2011 to 2019, the percentage of filed indemnity claims ever denied but with payment changed little, varying from 5.4% to 5.9%. However, the percentage ever denied and without payment rose from 6.7% to 10.9% and then fell back to 8.5% during the same period.

- Among filed indemnity claims with denials, the percentage with payment ranged from 44% to 47% from 1998 through 2011 but dropped to 34% to 39% for 2014 through 2019.68

  ➢ This reflects the fact that the trends in denied claims paid and denied claims not paid moved in parallel through 2011 but diverged thereafter.

- The decrease in the denial rate between 2004 and 2007 coincided with the 2005 initiation of DLI’s enhanced denial review process.69

1. Developed statistics from DLI data (see Appendix C). Filed indemnity claims are claims for indemnity benefits, including claims paid and claims never paid. Denied claims include claims denied and never paid, claims denied but eventually paid and claims initially paid but later denied.

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67 See note 1 in Figure 5.3.
68 These claims include cases denied but then paid and cases paid but then denied.
69 In this process, DLI requires insurers to indicate their reasons for claim denials in a manner compliant with statute and rule. The pronounced decrease in the denial rate between 2004 and 2007 suggests insurers may have refrained from making some denials they otherwise would have made, believing those denials might not withstand DLI scrutiny. See “DLI primary liability determination review process,” in COMPACT, August 2006, available from DLI Research and Statistics, 651-284-5025.
Prompt first action

Insurers must either begin payment on a wage-loss claim or deny the claim within 14 days of when the employer knows of the injury. This “prompt first action” is important not only for the sake of the injured worker, but also because it makes disputes less likely. The prompt-first-action rate increased from 2001 through 2010 but has leveled off since.

- The fiscal-year 2020 prompt-first-action rate was 88% overall, about three percentage points higher than in 1999, but about the same as in 2007.
- Both insurers and self-insurers exhibited a leveling-off after 2010.
- Self-insurers’ prompt first action rate averaged seven percentage points higher than the rate for insurers during the past 10 years.
- The rates for insurers and self-insurers fell somewhat in the most recent two or three years after peaking in 2017 and 2016, respectively.
- In compliance with statute and to improve workers’ compensation system performance, DLI publishes the annual *Prompt First Action Report on Workers’ Compensation Claims*, which indicates the prompt-first-action rates of individual insurers, self-insurers and the overall system.

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70 Minn. Stat, § 176.221.
71 Minn. Stat, § 176.223.
Certification of medical and rehabilitation disputes at DLI

The percentages of medical and rehabilitation disputes certified at DLI have fallen substantially since 1999.

- Between 1999 and 2020, the percentage certified fell from 68% to 52% for medical disputes and from 64% to 43% for rehabilitation disputes.
  - All of the decrease had occurred by 2014 for medical disputes and the certification rate increased to 52% in 2020.
  - For rehabilitation disputes, the percentage certified reached a low-point of 30% in 2017 before returning to 43% by 2020.

- The proportion of disputes certified was higher among medical disputes than among rehabilitation disputes for the entire period shown; the difference has widened since 2014.

Figure 5.5 Percentage of disputes certified at DLI, 1999-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of certification decision</th>
<th>Percentage certified</th>
<th>Medical disputes</th>
<th>Rehabilitation disputes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. The dispute certification process is triggered by the filing of a dispute certification request or a medical or rehabilitation request. Disputes as counted here include the filing of a certification request or a medical or rehabilitation request. The 2020 data only includes January through October.
Reason for noncertification at DLI: medical disputes

The increase in noncertification of medical disputes since 1999 has resulted entirely from an increase in the percentage not certified because the issues were resolved.

- From 1999 to 2020, the percentage of medical disputes (see note 1 in Figure 5.6) not certified because the issues were resolved rose from 18% to 31%, while the percentage not certified for other reasons changed by only two points, rising from 14% to 16% (see note 3 in Figure 5.6).

- Among noncertified medical disputes, the percentage not certified because they were resolved was 66% for 2020, as compared with 57% for 1999.

### Figure 5.6 Reason for noncertification of medical disputes at DLI, 1999-2020 [1]

| Year of certification decision | Reason not certified | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Pctg. of all non-certified medical disputes | Pctg. of non-certified medical disputes | Pctg. of all non-certified medical disputes | Pctg. of all non-certified medical disputes | Pctg. of all non-certified medical disputes |
| 1999 | 18% | 57% | 14% | 43% | 32% | 100% |
| 2005 | 23 | 57 | 17 | 43 | 40 | 100 |
| 2012 | 36 | 72 | 14 | 28 | 49 | 100 |
| 2016 | 35 | 68 | 17 | 32 | 52 | 100 |
| 2017 | 37 | 70 | 16 | 30 | 53 | 100 |
| 2018 | 34 | 67 | 17 | 33 | 50 | 100 |
| 2019 | 35 | 69 | 16 | 31 | 50 | 100 |
| 2020 | 31 | 66 | 16 | 34 | 48 | 100 |

1. Data from DLI. The medical dispute certification process is triggered by the filing of a dispute certification request for medical issues or a medical request. Medical disputes as counted here include the filing of a certification request for medical issues or a medical request. The 2020 data only includes January through October.

2. The resolution here could be the result of efforts by a DLI specialist or of the insurer indicating it intended from the start to pay for the services as requested.

3. Other reasons for noncertification include the following: the insurer needs additional time or information to decide its position; the same issues are already scheduled for a proceeding at DLI or OAH; the injured worker’s claim is subject to the provisions of a collective bargaining “carve-out” agreement (Minn. Stat. § 176.1812) and an administrative conference is currently deemed unnecessary; or a medical issue hasn’t previously been submitted to the internal dispute-resolution procedure of a certified managed care plan.
Reason for noncertification at DLI: rehabilitation disputes

In contrast with medical disputes, the increase in noncertification of rehabilitation disputes since 1999 has resulted from increases in both the percentage not certified because the issues were resolved and the percentage not certified for other reasons.

- From 1999 to 2017, the percentage of rehabilitation disputes (see note 1 in Figure 5.7) not certified because the issues were resolved rose from 23% to 44%. This percentage decreased after 2017, reaching 33% of all rehabilitation disputes in 2020. These disputes accounted for 64% of noncertified rehabilitation disputes in 1999 and 59% in 2020.

- During the same period, the percentage of rehabilitation disputes not certified for other reasons (see note 3 in Figure 5.7) rose from 13% to 23%. These disputes accounted for 36% of noncertified rehabilitation disputes in 1998 and 41% in 2020.

**Figure 5.7** Reason for noncertification of rehabilitation disputes at DLI, 1999-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of certification decision</th>
<th>Reason not certified</th>
<th>Total not certified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pctg. of all rehab.</td>
<td>Pctg. of non-certified rehab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disputes</td>
<td>disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. The rehabilitation dispute certification process is triggered by the filing of a dispute certification request for rehabilitation issues or a rehabilitation request. Rehabilitation disputes as counted here include the filing of a certification request for rehabilitation issues or a rehabilitation request. The 2020 data only includes January through October.

2. The resolution here could be the result of efforts by a DLI specialist or of the insurer indicating it intended from the start to pay for the services as requested.

3. Other reasons for noncertification include the following: the insurer needs additional time or information to decide its position; the same issues are already scheduled for a proceeding at DLI or OAH; or the injured worker's claim is subject to the provisions of a collective bargaining "carve-out" agreement (Minn. Stat. § 176.1812) and an administrative conference is currently deemed unnecessary.
DLI referrals to OAH

DLI referrals to OAH are far less frequent currently than in the early 2000s.

- The referral rate for medical disputes fell from a high of 64% in 2000 to 30% in 2007 and ranged from 29% to 33% for 2011 through 2020.

- The referral rate for rehabilitation disputes fell from a high of 58% in 2001 to 16% in 2007 and 2008; after remaining steady at 18% to 20% for 2009 to 2014, it increased to a range of 22% to 26% for 2015 to 2019 and further increased to 29% in 2020. The reason for this is uncertain.  

- The referral rate is higher for medical disputes than for rehabilitation disputes; this is at least partly because two types of medical disputes are automatically referred: those of more than $7,500 (unless they concern the amount of payment for services); and those involving surgery.  

73 One possible explanation is related to the 2013 law change requiring rehabilitation conferences to be held within 21 days of the rehabilitation request (unless the only issue is the amount of payment for services already provided or there is good cause) (see Appendix B). For rehabilitation requests in which the insurer is requesting a termination of rehabilitation services, there is often a concurrent discontinuance dispute at OAH. If the rehabilitation dispute at DLI is being dealt with more quickly than previously, the discontinuance dispute is more likely to still be in progress, so the rehabilitation dispute is more likely to be referred to OAH to be combined with the discontinuance dispute. However, this law change took effect Oct. 1, 2013, and DLI’s more rapid scheduling of rehabilitation conferences was evident in 2014 (see Figure 5.12), but the increase in the referral rate in Figure 5.8 is not apparent until 2015.

74 See p. 45 and note 52.

Figure 5.8 Percentage of DLI-certified disputes referred to OAH, 1999-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of certification decision</th>
<th>Percentage referred to OAH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Certified medical disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. The 2020 data only includes January through October.
Dispute resolution proceedings at DLI

Mediations account for a majority of dispute-resolution proceedings at DLI. With most DLI mediations, there are no medical or rehabilitation disputes pending at DLI.

- For 2018 to 2020, mediations accounted for 63% of DLI proceedings. In 96% of DLI mediations (or 60% of DLI proceedings), there were no medical or rehabilitation disputes pending at DLI. This is because most DLI mediations are on claim petition issues.\(^{75}\)

- Administrative conferences about medical issues accounted for 21% of DLI proceedings, while conferences about rehabilitation issues accounted for another 16%.

- For 2018 to 2020, 86% of DLI mediations (with and without disputes pending at DLI) resulted in agreement. In most of these cases, the resolution document is an award on stipulation (issued by OAH); for some, it is a mediation award (issued by DLI).

\(^{75}\) This is the experience of the DLI Alternative Dispute Resolution unit; the DLI data system does not track this information.
Dispute resolution proceedings at DLI: trends

While the total number of proceedings at DLI has increased since 1999, the numbers of mediations and administrative conferences have shown very different trends.

- From 1999 to 2020:
  - mediations more than tripled, increasing by 810;
  - administrative conferences fell by 200, or 28%; and
  - total mediations and conferences increased by 610.

- A turning point occurred in 2006 in the relative numbers of mediations and conferences. From 2006 to 2020, mediations rose by 910 while conferences fell by 870. This occurred because of an increased DLI emphasis on mediation and other early dispute-resolution activities.

- The number of mediations fluctuated significantly between 2008 and 2013.

Figure 5.10  Mediations and administrative conferences at DLI, 1999-2020 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of proceeding</th>
<th>Mediations</th>
<th>Administrative conferences [2]</th>
<th>Total proceedings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>2,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. Numbers rounded to nearest 10. The data for 2020 is multiplied by 12/10 because it only goes through October.
2. Includes conferences where agreement was reached.
Outcomes of DLI-certified disputes not referred to OAH

Among DLI-certified medical and rehabilitation disputes that are not referred to OAH, a majority are resolved at DLI by agreement or by decision-and-order.

- For 2018 to 2020 combined:
  - 36% of medical disputes were resolved by agreement at DLI (see note 2 in Figure 5.11) and another 31% by DLI decision-and-order; and
  - 43% of rehabilitation disputes were resolved by agreement at DLI and another 27% by DLI decision-and-order.

- For about 32% of medical disputes and 29% of rehabilitation disputes, the DLI outcome was a cancellation of a scheduled proceeding or withdrawal of the dispute. In a majority of these cases, there was a settlement (award on stipulation) or findings-and-order at OAH within two years. This was more likely for rehabilitation disputes (23% of all outcomes) than for medical disputes (19%).

- Overall, the main difference between medical and rehabilitation disputes was that rehabilitation disputes were more likely to be resolved by agreement at DLI or by settlement or findings-and-order (usually settlement) at OAH (within two years), and less likely to be resolved by DLI decision-and-order.

---

**Figure 5.11 Outcomes of DLI-certified disputes not referred to OAH, 2018-2020 average [1]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Description</th>
<th>Medical disputes</th>
<th>Rehabilitation disputes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolved at DLI by agreement [2]</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolved at DLI by decision-and-order</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI proceeding canceled or issue withdrawn; settlement or findings-and-order at OAH within two years [3]</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI proceeding canceled or issue withdrawn; no settlement or findings-and-order at OAH within two years [3]</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data from DLI. The 2020 data is multiplied by 12/10 because it only goes through October.
2. Since this figure is limited to DLI-certified disputes not referred to OAH, it excludes most DLI mediation agreements — specifically, those about issues other than a medical or rehabilitation dispute at DLI (see Figure 5.9). The “agreement” category here includes (in declining order of frequency): instances of conference canceled because of prior issue resolution; conference held and issues resolved without DLI written agreement; conference held and issues resolved with DLI written agreement; mediation held and issues resolved without DLI written agreement; conference or mediation held with issues resolved with a DLI mediation award; and issues resolved prior to conference by DLI intervention. Where an agreement is reached without a DLI document, the agreement is often incorporated in an award on stipulation at OAH.
3. The canceled DLI proceeding may be an administrative conference or mediation. "Withdrawn" means the dispute was withdrawn at DLI (not necessarily OAH). This category also includes DLI mediations held with no agreement and cases where the dispute parties no longer respond to DLI communications. An OAH findings-and-order may occur in these disputes because they may be consolidated with other OAH disputes.
Dispute resolutions at DLI

About 86% of dispute resolutions at DLI are by agreement, and most of these are through informal intervention.

- For 2018 to 2020 combined, 61% of DLI dispute resolutions were by informal intervention; most of these (51% of resolutions at DLI) were during or after the dispute certification process.

- Another 25% of DLI resolutions were agreements via conference or mediation.

- The remaining 14% took the form of decision-and-orders.

Figure 5.12 Dispute resolutions at DLI, 2018-2020 average [1]

1. Data from DLI. Numbers rounded to nearest 10. The 2020 data is multiplied by 12/10 because it only goes through October.
2. These resolutions are accomplished by a DLI specialist via phone, walk-in contact or correspondence before a dispute certification request, medical request or rehabilitation request has been submitted.
3. These resolutions are accomplished by a DLI specialist via phone, walk-in contact or correspondence after a dispute certification request, medical request or rehabilitation request has been submitted. If the resolution occurs during the dispute certification process, a dispute is not certified. If it occurs after that process, this means a dispute has been certified.
4. These include mediation awards and other agreements from conference or mediation. All DLI mediation agreements are counted here, including those on issues other than medical and rehabilitation disputes at DLI (see Figure 5.9).
5. Virtually all decision-and-orders are via administrative conference. Since 2010, nonconference decision-and-orders have numbered at most one a year.
Time to first conference for medical and rehabilitation requests at DLI

The times from medical and rehabilitation requests to the first scheduled conference at DLI have followed widely divergent paths since 2013.

- For medical requests, the median time from the request to the first scheduled conference dropped from 53 days in 2011 to 37 days in 2013, but ended the period shown at 49 days in 2018 after a peak in 2017.

- For rehabilitation requests, the median time dropped from 55 days in 2011 to 20 to 21 days for 2014 to 2017 and then increased to 25 days in 2018.

- These decreases in 2013 and 2014 were in response to the 2013 law change requiring rehabilitation conferences to take place within 21 days of the request (unless the only issue is the amount of payment for services already provided or there is good cause).\textsuperscript{76}

- The median time to first conference had been fairly stable for both medical and rehabilitation requests from 2006 through 2011.

- Prior to the 2013 law change, the median time to first conference was about the same for medical and rehabilitation requests.

\textsuperscript{76} See Appendix B.

---

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Median time from request to first scheduled conference for medical and rehabilitation requests at DLI, request-receipt years 2001-2018 [1]}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year request received</th>
<th>Median days from request to first scheduled conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Medical requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\end{table}

1. DLI data. Disputes with both medical and rehabilitation requests are counted with both medical request disputes and rehabilitation request disputes if the two requests were no more than 10 days apart. Years prior to 2001 are unavailable.
Time from conference to decision-and-order for medical and rehabilitation requests at DLI

The median time from conference to decision-and-order at DLI was most recently less than a week for both medical and rehabilitation requests.

- The median times for 2016 to 2018 were six days for medical and four to six days for rehabilitation requests.

- For the period shown, the median time for medical requests was the same as or more than the time for rehabilitation requests.

- There does not seem to be an overall trend in these numbers since 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year request received</th>
<th>Median days from last scheduled conference to decision-and-order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. DLI data. Disputes with both medical and rehabilitation requests are counted with both medical request disputes and rehabilitation request disputes if the two requests were no more than 10 days apart. Years prior to 2001 are unavailable.
Time from request to decision-and-order for medical and rehabilitation requests at DLI

The times from medical and rehabilitation requests to a related decision-and-order at DLI have followed very different paths in the past five years.

- For medical requests, the median time from the request to decision-and-order dropped from 65 days in 2011 to 49 days in 2013, but increased thereafter, posting a value of 63 days for 2018, not much different from 2001.

- For rehabilitation requests, the median time dropped from 64 days in 2011 to a range of 28 to 32 days for 2014 through 2017 but increased to 36 days for 2018.

  ➢ The decreases after 2012 resulted from the faster scheduling of rehabilitation conferences in response to the 2013 law change (Figure 5.13).77

- The median time to decision-and-order had been fairly stable for both medical and rehabilitation requests from 2006 through 2011.

- The median time to decision-and-order was about the same for medical and rehabilitation requests from 2004 through 2013.

- These trends reflect the trends in the time to the first scheduled conference and from the last scheduled conference to decision-and-order (Figures 5.13 and 5.14); they also partly reflect re-sets for some conferences.78 For 2016 to 2018, conference re-sets occurred for 18% of medical requests and 11% of rehabilitation requests; in these cases, the median times between the first and last scheduled conferences were 44 and 30 days, respectively.

- The time from request to decision-and-order varies around the median. For 2016 through 2018, at the 75th percentile, the times were 84 and 46 days for medical and rehabilitation requests, respectively; at the 90th percentile, the times were 110 and 64 days, respectively.

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77 See Appendix B.
78 A conference can be re-set only upon showing of good cause (Minnesota Rules part 1415.3700, subpart 6).
Mediation awards and awards on stipulation resulting from mediations at DLI

During the past several years, DLI mediations have shifted toward litigated disputes with complex issues. Reflecting this, the resolution document where agreement is reached is currently almost always an award on stipulation (at OAH) rather than a mediation award (at DLI).

- In cases where a DLI mediation has produced agreement, the percentage of cases where the resolution document was a mediation award (at DLI) dropped from 77% in 2006 to just 1% to 2% for 2016 to 2018. During the same period, the percentage with an award on stipulation (at OAH) increased from 15% to 93% to 95%.^79

^79 See note 2 in Figure 5.16.
Time from mediation request to first scheduled mediation at DLI

The median time from the mediation request to mediation session has increased during the past several years; this is partly, but not totally, because of the shift in DLI mediations toward more complex cases.

- For cases ending with a mediation award at DLI (the less-complex cases), the median time to first scheduled mediation ranged from three to eight days from 2001 to 2015 but dropped to three days for 2017 and 2018.

- For cases ending with an award on stipulation at OAH (the more-complex cases), the median time to first scheduled mediation was generally somewhat less than 30 days from 2003 to 2010, but increased to 52 days by 2018.

- Partly because of the shift toward more-complex cases (Figure 5.16), the median time to first scheduled mediation for all cases combined rose steeply after 2006. Through 2006, the overall median was close to that for the simpler cases (ending with a mediation award at DLI); from 2011 onward, it was close to the median for the more-complex cases (ending with an award on stipulation at OAH). Since the more-complex cases made up most of all cases after 2011, the trend in the median time for the more-complex cases explains the trend in the median time for all cases combined after 2011.

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**Figure 5.17** Median time from mediation request to first scheduled mediation for mediation requests at DLI, request-receipt years 2001-2018 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year received</th>
<th>Cases ending a mediation award at DLI [2,3]</th>
<th>Cases ending an award on stipulation at OAH [2,3]</th>
<th>All cases [3]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. DLI data. Years prior to 2001 are unavailable.
2. Cases with both a mediation award and an award on stipulation are counted among cases with a mediation award.
3. "All cases" includes cases with neither a mediation award nor an award on stipulation. This is why it is possible, as it happens, for the median days for all cases for 2017 to be greater than both the median for cases with a mediation award and the median for cases with an award on stipulation.
Timelines after mediations at DLI that end with an award on stipulation

In considering timelines after DLI mediations, this page focuses on cases ending with an award on stipulation (at OAH) because they have constituted the vast majority of DLI mediation cases for the past several years. In these cases, currently, the award on stipulation typically occurs about two months after the mediation. Most of that time consists of the time taken by the parties’ attorneys to file a stipulation for settlement with OAH after resolution has been reached.

- At the median, resolution of the issues has been achieved the day of the mediation or the day after for all years from 2002 to 2018 except 2004 and 2005. DLI involvement in the process is concluded when the issues are resolved.

- For 2017 and 2018, the median time from issue resolution to the filing of the stipulation for settlement at OAH was 49 or 50 days. This was at the level of previous low-point reached in 2009.

- The median time from the filing of the stipulation for settlement to the issuing of an award on stipulation by an OAH judge was two or three days from 2005 to 2018.

- The overall result of these timelines was that the median time from the last scheduled mediation to the award on stipulation was 57 or 59 days for 2017 and 2018, the lowest for the period shown.

Figure 5.18 Timelines after mediation for mediation requests at DLI that end with an award on stipulation (at OAH), request-receipt years 2002-2018 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year request received</th>
<th>Median days from:</th>
<th>Last scheduled mediation to issue resolution [2]</th>
<th>Issue resolution to stipulation for settlement [2,3]</th>
<th>Stipulation for settlement to award on stip. [3]</th>
<th>Last scheduled mediation to award on stipulation [3]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. DLI data. Years prior to 2002 are unavailable.
2. Issue resolution may occur in the mediation or afterward via communication among the parties (and sometimes DLI). If the resolution occurs after the mediation, DLI is notified and records it.
3. A stipulation for settlement is written by attorneys for the parties after issue resolution and is submitted to OAH for approval via an award on stipulation.
Time from mediation request to award on stipulation for mediations at DLI that end with an award on stipulation

For DLI mediations that end with an award on stipulation at OAH, the total time from the mediation request to the award on stipulation has been, at the median, between three-and-a-half and four months for the past eight years.

- For mediation requests received from 2011 to 2018, the median total time to the award on stipulation ranged from 107 to 118 days.

- High and low points occurred in 2005 (141 days) and 2009 (96 days).

- This timeline reflects the timelines in Figures 5.16 and 5.17. It also reflects the fact that some mediations had re-sets. For 2016 to 2018, 12% of mediations had re-sets for a median of 33 days.

- The time from request to award on stipulation varies around the median. For 2016 through 2018, at the 75th and 90th percentiles, the times were 143 and 193 days, respectively.

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Figure 5.19Median time from mediation request to award on stipulation for mediation requests at DLI that end with an award on stipulation (at OAH), request-receipt years 2002-2018 [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year request received</th>
<th>Median days from mediation request to award on stipulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. DLI data. Cases with both a mediation award and an award on stipulation are excluded. The timelines here reflect timelines in Figures 5.17 and 5.18. Years prior to 2002 are unavailable.
Appendix A

Glossary

The following terms are used in this report.\(^{80}\)

**Accident year** — The year in which the accident or condition occurred giving rise to the injury or illness. In accident year data, all claims and costs are tied to the year in which the accident occurred. Accident year, used with insurance data, is equivalent to injury-year, used with Department of Labor and Industry data.

**Administrative conference** — An expedited, informal proceeding where parties present and discuss viewpoints in a dispute. With some exceptions, administrative conferences are conducted for medical and vocational rehabilitation disputes presented on a medical or rehabilitation request,\(^{81}\) they are also conducted for disputes about discontinuance of wage-loss benefits presented by a claimant’s request for administrative conference. Medical and rehabilitation conferences are conducted at either the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) or the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) depending on whether DLI has referred the issues concerned to OAH.\(^{82}\) Discontinuance conferences are conducted at OAH. If agreement is achieved at the conference, an “order on agreement” is issued, which is binding unless appealed. If agreement is not achieved, the DLI specialist or OAH judge issues a “decision-and-order,” also binding unless appealed. A party may appeal a DLI or OAH decision-and-order or order on agreement by requesting a *de novo* hearing at OAH.

**Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System (ASCPS)** — Minnesota’s payment system for workers’ compensation ambulatory surgical center facility services provided on or after Oct. 1, 2018. It is based on Medicare’s ASCPS. Payment depends on the procedures performed, and under statute is the lesser of 320% of Medicare or the usual and customary charge of all services, supplies and implantable devices provided.

**Assigned Risk Plan (ARP)** — Minnesota’s workers’ compensation insurer of last resort, which insures employers unable to insure themselves in the voluntary market. The ARP is necessary because all non-exempt employers are required to have workers’ compensation insurance or self-insure. The Department of Commerce operates the ARP through contracts with private companies for administrative services. The Department of Commerce sets the ARP premium rates, which are different from the voluntary market rates.

**Causation** — The issue of whether the medical condition or disability for which the employee requests benefits or services was caused by an admitted injury (one for which the insurer or employer has admitted primary liability). An insurer denying benefits or services on the basis of causation is claiming the medical condition or disability in question did not arise from the admitted work injury.

**Claim petition** — A form by which the injured worker contests a denial of primary liability or requests an award of indemnity benefits or in some cases medical or rehabilitation benefits. In response to a claim petition, the Office of Administrative Hearings generally schedules a settlement conference or formal hearing.

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\(^{80}\) These definitions are only intended to help the reader understand the material presented in this report. They are not intended to be legally definitive or exhaustive.

\(^{81}\) As indicated on p. 46, some issues presented on a medical or rehabilitation request are heard in a formal hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings rather than in an administrative conference.

\(^{82}\) See discussion of DLI administrative conferences on p. 45 (including note 52) for types of medical and vocational rehabilitation disputes referred to OAH.
Cost-of-living adjustment — An annual adjustment of temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent total disability or dependents’ benefits computed from the annual change in the statewide average weekly wage (SAWW). The percent adjustment is equal to the proportion by which the SAWW in effect at the time of the adjustment differs from the SAWW in effect one year earlier, not to exceed a statutory limit. For injuries from Oct. 1, 1995, through Sept. 30, 2013, the cost-of-living adjustment was limited to 2% a year and was delayed until the fourth anniversary of the injury. For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2013, the cost-of-living adjustment is limited to 3% a year and delayed until the third anniversary of the injury.

Dependents’ benefits — Benefits paid to dependents of a worker who has died from a work-related injury or illness. These benefits are equal to a percentage of the worker’s gross pre-injury wage and are paid for a specified period of time, depending on the dependents concerned.

Developed statistics — Estimates of the values of claim statistics (for example, number of claims, average claim cost, dispute rate, vocational rehabilitation participation rate) at a given claim maturity. Developed statistics are relevant for accident year, policy-year, injury-year and vocational rehabilitation plan-closure year data. They are obtained by applying development factors, based on historical rates of development of the statistic in question, to tabulated numbers.

Development — The change over time in a claim statistic (for example, number or cost of claims) for a particular accident year, policy-year, injury-year or vocational rehabilitation (VR) plan-closure year. The reported numbers develop both because of the time necessary for claims to mature and, in the case of Department of Labor and Industry data, because of reporting lags.

Diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system — Minnesota’s payment system for workers’ compensation hospital inpatient facility services, effective for services provided on or after Jan. 1, 2016. It is based on Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). In the IPPS, a hospitalization is categorized – on the basis of principal diagnosis and primary treatment performed – into a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) and payment is then determined mainly from the DRG. For hospitals that are not Medicare-designated Critical Access Hospitals, Minnesota’s DRG system provides for payment at 200% of the Medicare level, not to exceed the charged amount, or 75% of charges in catastrophic (high-cost) cases. For Critical Access Hospitals, payment is 100% of charges. As of Oct. 1, 2020, the threshold for catastrophic cases was total charges of $226,888.

Under the DRG payment system, a set of requirements regarding bill payment and denial takes effect when certain conditions are met. These conditions are: the hospital submits its charges to the insurer electronically; a DRG applies to the hospitalization; and the total charges in the case are less than the threshold for payment under the catastrophic provision. When these conditions are met, the insurer: must not require an itemization of charges or additional documentation to support a bill; and must, within 30 days of receipt, either pay the bill (with no reductions based on line-item review) or deny the entire bill on the basis that the condition for which the person is in the hospital is not work-related or that the hospitalization is not reasonably required. Under certain conditions, the insurer may do a post-payment audit with line-item review.

Discontinuance dispute — A dispute about the discontinuance of wage-loss benefits, most often initiated when the claimant requests an administrative conference (usually by phone) in response to the insurer’s declared intention to discontinue temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits. The conference is conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). A discontinuance dispute may also be presented on the Employee’s Objection to Discontinuance for or the insurer’s petition to discontinue benefits, either of which triggers a hearing at OAH.

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83 The SAWW is calculated according to Minnesota Statutes § 176.011. The annual benefit adjustment is as provided in Minn. Stat. § 176.645.
84 See note 85.
85 Development occurs in VR plan-closure year data because a claim may have more than one VR plan and the plan-closure year statistics are computed for all plans combined, categorized by the closure year of the last plan.
Discontinuance of wage-loss benefits — The insurer may propose to discontinue wage-loss benefits (temporary total, temporary partial or unadjudicated permanent total disability) if it believes one of the legal conditions for discontinuance have been met. See “Notice of Intention to Discontinue,” “Request for Administrative Conference,” “Objection to Discontinuance” and “petition to discontinue benefits.”

Dispute certification — A process required by statute in which, in a medical or rehabilitation dispute, the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) must certify a dispute exists and that informal intervention did not resolve the dispute before an attorney may charge for services. The certification process is triggered by either a certification request or a medical or rehabilitation request. DLI specialists attempt to resolve the dispute informally during the certification process.

Employee’s Objection to Discontinuance — A form by which the injured worker requests a formal hearing to contest a discontinuance of wage-loss benefits (temporary total, temporary partial or permanent total disability) proposed by the insurer by means of a Notice of Intention to Discontinue Workers’ Compensation Benefits form or a petition to discontinue benefits. The hearing is conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Employee’s Request for Administrative Conference — A form by which the injured worker requests an administrative conference to contest a discontinuance of wage-loss benefits (temporary total, temporary partial or permanent total disability) proposed by the insurer on the Notice of Intention to Discontinue Workers’ Compensation Benefits form. Requests for a discontinuance conference are usually done by phone.

Experience modification factor — A factor computed by an insurer to modify an employer’s premium on the basis of the employer’s recent loss experience relative to the overall experience for all employers in the same payroll class. For statistical reliability reasons, the “mod” more closely reflects the employer’s own experience for larger employers than for smaller employers.

Full-time-equivalent covered employment — An estimate of the number of full-time employees who would work the same total number of hours during a year as the actual workers’ compensation covered employees, some of whom work part-time or overtime. It is used in computing workers’ compensation claims incidence rates.

Hearing — A formal proceeding about a disputed issue or issues in a workers’ compensation claim, conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). After the hearing, the judge issues a “findings-and-order,” which is binding unless appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals. OAH conducts formal hearings about disputes presented on claim petitions and other petitions where resolution through a settlement conference is not possible. OAH also conducts hearings about some discontinuance disputes (those presented on an Employee’s Objection to Discontinuance form or a petition to discontinue benefits), disputes referred by the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) because they do not seem amenable to less formal resolution, disputes about proposed surgery and disputes about miscellaneous issues such as attorney fees. Finally, OAH conducts de novo formal hearings when requested by a party to an administrative-conference decision-and-order from DLI or OAH or a nonconference decision-and-order from DLI.

Hospital Outpatient Fee Schedule (HOFs) — Minnesota’s payment system for certain workers’ compensation hospital outpatient facility services, effective for services provided on or after Oct. 1, 2018. It is based primarily on those portions of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System that relate to major surgical procedures and emergency department (ED) visits. For cases with major procedures, payment is based on the procedure regardless of other services provided. For cases with ED or clinic visits and no major procedures, payment is based on the ED or clinic visit and other services provided. Under statute, DLI has determined payment levels, separately for small and large hospitals (those with up to 100 beds and more than 100 beds, respectively), relative to Medicare so as to produce the same

86 Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c).

87 Minnesota Rules part 1420.2150, subpart 1 provides for expedited hearings on not-yet-provided-surgery issues.
overall payment amounts as under the prior system.

DLI calculated that in 2018 small hospitals were reimbursed at 472% of the Medicare rate and large hospitals at 251%, respectively. At the time, for cases with ED or clinic visits and not major procedures, these percentages applied to the ED or clinic visit only.

**Indemnity benefit** — A benefit to the injured or ill worker or survivors to compensate for wage loss, functional impairment or death. Indemnity benefits include: temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability benefits; supplementary benefits; dependents’ benefits; and, in the insurance industry accounting, vocational rehabilitation benefits.

**Indemnity claim** — A claim with paid indemnity benefits. Most indemnity claims involve more than three days of total or partial disability, since this is the threshold for qualifying for temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits, which are paid on most of these claims. Indemnity claims typically include medical costs in addition to indemnity costs.

**Injury-year** — The year in which the injury occurred or the illness began. In injury-year data, all claims, costs and other statistics are tied to the year in which the injury occurred. Injury-year, used with Department of Labor and Industry data, is essentially equivalent to accident year, used with insurance data.

**Intervention** — An instance in which the Department of Labor and Industry provides information or assistance to prevent a potential dispute from developing into an actual one or communicates with the parties (outside of a conference or mediation) to resolve a dispute or determine whether a dispute should be certified. (This is different from the intervention process in which an interested person or entity not originally involved in the dispute becomes a party to the dispute.) A dispute resolution through intervention may occur before, during or after the dispute certification process.

**Mediation** — A voluntary, informal proceeding to facilitate agreement among the parties in a dispute. A mediation occurs at the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) or the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) (or with a private mediator) when one party requests it and the others agree to participate. This often takes place after attempts at resolution by phone and correspondence have failed. If agreement is reached in a DLI mediation, the specialist formally records its terms in a “mediation award” or the parties incorporate the agreement into a stipulation for settlement and submit it to OAH for an award on stipulation. If agreement is reached in an OAH mediation, the parties usually file a stipulation for settlement which the OAH judge incorporates into an award on stipulation. However, sometimes an agreement from an OAH mediation is recorded in a mediation award issued by the OAH judge. Mediations also occur outside of DLI and OAH; when such a mediation produces agreement, the agreement is usually incorporated into a stipulation for settlement and submitted to OAH for an award on stipulation.

**Medical cost** — The cost of medical services and supplies provided to the injured or ill worker, including payments to providers and certain reimbursements to the worker. Workers’ compensation covers the costs of all reasonable and necessary medical services related to the injury or illness, subject to maximums established in law.

**Medical dispute** — A dispute about a medical issue, such as choice of providers, nature and timing of treatments or appropriate payments to providers.

**Medical-only claim** — A claim with paid medical costs and no indemnity benefits.

**Medical Request** — A form by which a party to a medical dispute requests assistance from the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) in resolving the dispute. The request may lead to mediation or other efforts toward informal resolution by DLI or to an administrative conference at DLI or the Office of Administrative Hearings (see administrative conference).

**Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWCIA)** — Minnesota’s workers’ compensation data service organization (DSO). State law specifies the duties of the DSO and the Department of Commerce designates the entity
to be the DSO. Among other activities, MWCLA collects data about claims, premium and losses from insurers, and annually produces pure premium rates.

Nonconference decision and order — A decision issued by the Department of Labor and Industry, without an administrative conference, in a dispute for which it has administrative conference authority (see “administrative conference”). The decision is binding unless a dispute party requests a formal hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Notice of Intention to Discontinue Workers’ Compensation Benefits (NOID) — A form by which the insurer informs the worker of its intention to discontinue temporary total, temporary partial or unadjudicated permanent total disability benefits. In contrast with a petition to discontinue benefits, the NOID brings about benefit termination if the worker does not contest it.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) — An executive branch body that conducts hearings in administrative law cases. One section is responsible for workers’ compensation cases; it conducts administrative conferences, mediations, settlement conferences and hearings.

Permanent partial disability (PPD) — A benefit that compensates for permanent functional impairment resulting from a work-related injury or illness. The benefit is based on the worker’s impairment rating, which is a percentage of whole-body impairment determined on the basis of health care providers’ assessments according to a rating schedule in rules. The PPD benefit is calculated under a schedule specified in law, which assigns a benefit amount per rating point with higher ratings receiving proportionately higher benefits. The scheduled amounts per rating point were fixed for injuries from 1984 through September 2000, but were raised in the 2000 law change for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2000, and in the 2018 law change for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2018. The PPD benefit is paid after temporary total disability (TTD) benefits have ended. For injuries from October 1995 through September 2000, it is paid at the same rate and intervals as TTD until the overall amount is exhausted. For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2000, the PPD benefit may be paid in this manner or as a lump sum, computed with a discount rate not to exceed 5%.

Permanent total disability (PTD) — A wage-replacement benefit paid if the worker sustains a severe work-related injury specified in law or if the worker, because of a work-related injury or illness in combination with other factors, is permanently unable to secure gainful employment, provided that, for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 1995, the worker has a PPD rating of at least 13% to 17%, depending on age and education. The benefit is equal to two-thirds of the worker’s gross pre-injury wage, subject to minimum and maximum weekly amounts, and is paid at the same intervals as wages were paid before the injury. For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 1995, weekly benefits are subject to a minimum of 65% of the statewide average weekly wage. The maximum weekly benefit amount is indicated in Appendix B. For injuries from Oct. 1, 1995, to Sept. 30, 2018, benefits end at age 67 under a rebuttable presumption of retirement. For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2018, benefits end at age 72 or, if the injury is after age 67, after five years of benefits have been paid. Cost-of-living adjustments are described in this appendix.

Petition to discontinue benefits — A document by which the insurer requests a formal hearing to allow a discontinuance of wage-loss benefits (temporary total disability, temporary partial disability or unadjudicated permanent total disability). The hearing is conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Policy-year — The year of initiation of the insurance policy covering the accident or condition that caused the worker’s injury or illness. In policy-year data, all claims and costs are tied to the year in which the applicable policy took effect. Since policy periods often include portions of two calendar years, the data for a policy-year includes claims and costs for injuries occurring in two different calendar years.

Primary liability — The overall liability of the insurer for any costs associated with an injury when the injury is determined to be compensable. An insurer may deny primary liability (deny the injury is compensable) if it has reason to believe the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment or is not
covered under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation law.

**Pure premium** — A measure of expected indemnity and medical losses, equal to the sum, over all insurance classes, of payroll multiplied by the class-specific pure premium rates, adjusted for individual employers’ prior loss experience. It is different from (and somewhat lower than) the actual premium charged to employers, because actual premium includes other insurance company costs plus taxes and assessments.

**Pure premium rates** — Rates of expected indemnity and medical losses a year per $100 of covered payroll, also referred to as “loss costs.” Pure premium rates are determined annually by the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWCIA) for approximately 560 insurance classes in the voluntary market. They are based on insurer “experience” and statutory benefit changes. “Experience” refers to actual losses relative to pure premium for the most recent report periods. The pure premium rates are published with documentation in the annual Minnesota Ratemaking Report subject to approval by the Department of Commerce. From 2016 to 2020, MWCIA has gradually increased the maturity level of the losses reflected in the pure premium rates.

**Rehabilitation Request** — A form by which a party to a vocational rehabilitation dispute requests assistance from the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) in resolving the dispute. The request may lead to mediation or other efforts toward informal resolution by DLI or to an administrative conference, usually at DLI but occasionally at the Office of Administrative Hearings (see administrative conference).

**Reserves** — Funds that an insurer or self-insurer sets aside to pay expected future claim costs.

**Second-injury claim** — A claim for which the insurer (or self-insured employer) is entitled to reimbursement from the Special Compensation Fund because the injury was a subsequent (or “second”) injury for the worker concerned. The 1992 law eliminated reimbursement (to insurers) of second-injury claims for subsequent injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1992.

**Self-insurance** — A mode of workers’ compensation insurance in which an employer or employer group insures itself or its members. To do so, the employer or employer group must meet financial requirements and be approved by the Department of Commerce.

**Settlement conference** — A proceeding conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings to achieve a negotiated settlement, where possible, without a formal hearing. If achieved, the settlement typically takes the form of a “stipulation for settlement” (see “settlement benefits”).

**Settlement benefits** — Indemnity and medical benefits specified in a “stipulation for settlement,” which states the terms of settlement of a claim among the affected parties. A stipulation usually occurs in the context of a dispute, but not always. The stipulation may be reached independently by the parties or in a settlement conference or associated preparatory activities. It may be incorporated into a mediation award or an “award on stipulation,” usually the latter, which is approved by a judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings. The stipulation usually includes an agreement by the claimant to release the employer and insurer from future liability for the claim other than for medical treatment. Settlement benefits are usually paid in a lump sum.

**Special Compensation Fund (SCF)** — A fund within the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) that pays, among other things, uninsured claims and reimburses insurers (including self-insured employers) for supplementary and second-injury benefit payments. (The supplementary-benefit and second-injury provisions only apply to older claims because they were eliminated by the law changes of 1995 and 1992, respectively.) The SCF also funds workers’ compensation functions at DLI, the nonfederal portion of the cost of DLI’s Minnesota OSHA Compliance functions, the workers’ compensation portion of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals and workers’ compensation functions at the Department of Commerce. Revenues come primarily from an assessment on insurers (passed on to employers through a premium surcharge) and self-insured employers.
Statewide average weekly wage (SAWW) —
The average wage used by insurers and the Department of Labor and Industry to adjust certain workers’ compensation benefits. This report uses the SAWW to adjust average benefit amounts for different years so they are all expressed in constant (2019) wage dollars. The SAWW, from the Department of Employment and Economic Development, is the average weekly wage of nonfederal workers covered under unemployment insurance.

Supplementary benefits — Additional benefits paid to certain workers receiving temporary total disability (TTD) or permanent total disability (PTD) benefits for injuries prior to October 1995. These benefits are equal to the difference between 65% of the statewide average weekly wage and the TTD or PTD benefit. The Special Compensation Fund reimburses insurers (and self-insured employers) for supplementary benefit payments. Supplementary benefits were repealed for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 1995.

Temporary partial disability (TPD) — A wage-replacement benefit paid if the worker is employed with earnings that are reduced because of a work-related injury or illness. (The benefit is not payable for the first three calendar days of total or partial disability unless the disability lasts, continuously or intermittently, for at least 10 days.) The benefit is equal to two-thirds of the difference between the worker’s gross pre-injury wage and gross current wage, subject to a maximum weekly amount, and is paid at the same intervals as wages were paid before the injury. An additional limit is that the weekly TPD benefit plus the employee’s weekly wage earned while receiving TPD benefits may not exceed 500% of the SAWW.

For injuries from Oct. 1, 1992, through Sept. 30, 2018, TPD benefits are limited to a total of 225 weeks and to the first 450 weeks after the injury (with an exception for approved retraining). For injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2018, benefits are limited to a total of 275 weeks and to the first 450 weeks after the injury (with an exception for approved retraining). The maximum weekly benefit amount is indicated in Appendix B. Cost-of-living adjustments are described in this appendix.

Temporary total disability (TTD) — A wage-replacement benefit paid if the worker is unable to work because of a work-related injury or illness. (The benefit is not payable for the first three calendar days of total or partial disability unless the disability lasts, continuously or intermittently, for at least 10 days.) The benefit is equal to two-thirds of the worker’s gross pre-injury wage, subject to minimum and maximum weekly amounts, and is paid at the same intervals as wages were paid before the injury.

Currently, TTD stops if: the employee returns to work; the employee is released to work without physical restrictions from the injury; the employee withdraws from the labor market; the employee fails to diligently search for work within his or her physical restrictions; the employee refuses an appropriate offer of employment; 90 days have passed after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement or completed an approved retraining plan; or the employee fails to cooperate with an approved vocational rehabilitation plan or with certain procedures in the development of such a plan. TTD also stops, for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 1995, after 104 weeks of TTD have been paid, or for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2008, after 130 weeks of TTD have been paid (with an exception for approved retraining). Minimum and maximum weekly benefit provisions are described in Appendix B. Cost-of-living adjustments are described in this appendix.

Vocational rehabilitation (VR) dispute — A dispute about a VR issue, such as whether the employee should be evaluated for VR eligibility, whether he or she is eligible, whether certain VR plan provisions are appropriate or whether the employee is cooperating with the plan.

Vocational rehabilitation (VR) plan — A plan for VR services developed by a qualified rehabilitation consultant (QRC) in consultation with the employee and the employer and/or insurer. The plan is developed after the QRC determines the injured worker to be eligible for VR services. It is filed with the Department of Labor and Industry and provided to the affected parties. The plan indicates the vocational goal, the services necessary to achieve the goal and their expected duration and cost.

Voluntary market — The workers’ compensation insurance market associated with policies issued voluntarily by insurers. Insurers
may choose whether to insure a particular employer. See “Assigned Risk Plan.”

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) — An executive branch body that hears appeals of workers’ compensation findings-and-orders from the Office of Administrative Hearings. WCCA decisions may be appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association (WCRA) — A nonprofit entity created by law to provide reinsurance to workers’ compensation insurers (including self-insurers) in Minnesota. Every workers’ compensation insurer must purchase “excess of loss” reinsurance (reinsurance for losses above a specified limit per event) from WCRA. Insurers may obtain other forms of reinsurance (such as aggregate coverage for total losses above a specified amount) through other means.

Written premium — The entire “bottom-line” premium for insurance policies initiated in a given year, regardless of when the premium comes due and is paid. Written premium is “bottom-line” in that it reflects all premium modifications in the pricing of the policies.
Appendix B

Workers’ compensation law changes

Some workers’ compensation law changes enacted since 1998 are relevant for this report. This appendix summarizes those law changes. Law changes that do not significantly affect the trends in this report are not considered.

2000 law change

The following provisions took effect for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2000.

Temporary total disability (TTD) minimum benefit — The minimum weekly TTD benefit was raised from $104 to $130, not to exceed the employee’s pre-injury wage.

Temporary total disability (TTD), temporary partial disability (TPD) and permanent total disability (PTD) maximum benefit — The maximum weekly TTD, TPD and PTD benefit was raised from $615 to $750. (This maximum was raised again in 2008 and 2013; see below.)

Permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits — Benefit amounts were raised for all impairment ratings. At the time, DLI estimated that this would increase overall PPD benefits by 14 percent. In addition, the PPD award may be paid as a lump sum, computed with a discount rate not to exceed 5 percent. Previously, PPD benefits were only payable in installments at the same interval and amount as the employee’s temporary total disability benefits.

Death cases — A $60,000 minimum total benefit was established for dependency benefits. In death cases with no dependents, a $60,000 payment to the estate of the deceased was established and the $25,000 payment to the Special Compensation Fund was eliminated. The burial allowance was increased from $7,500 to $15,000.

2005 law change

The following provision took effect for medical request disputes filed on or after May 26, 2005.

Jurisdiction in medical disputes — The monetary limit on DLI jurisdiction in medical disputes was raised from $1,500 to $7,500.

2008 law change

The following provisions took effect for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2008.

Temporary total disability (TTD), temporary partial disability (TPD) and permanent total disability (PTD) maximum benefit — The maximum weekly TTD, TPD and PTD benefit was raised from $750 to $850. (This maximum was raised again in 2013; see below.)

Temporary total disability (TTD) duration limit — The limit on the total number of weeks of TTD benefits was raised from 104 to 130. (An exception to the duration limit is available for approved retraining.)

2011 law change

The following provisions took effect Aug. 1, 2011.

Scheduling of proceedings at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) — OAH must schedule a settlement conference to occur within 180 days of the filing of a claim petition, and within 45 days of the filing of a petition to discontinue benefits, objection to discontinuance or request for de novo hearing. If settlement is not reached, OAH must schedule a hearing to occur no more than 90 days after the scheduled settlement conference, or sooner if statute
requires an expedited hearing on the issues concerned.

2013 law change

The following provisions took effect for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2013. 88

Temporary total disability (TTD), temporary partial disability (TPD) and permanent total disability (PTD) maximum benefit — The maximum weekly TTD, TPD and PTD benefit was raised from $850 to 102% of the statewide average weekly wage (SAWW). The SAWW in effect for injuries in each year beginning Oct. 1 is the SAWW reflecting wages paid during the year ending the prior Dec. 31.

Cost-of-living adjustment of temporary total disability (TTD), temporary partial disability (TPD), permanent total disability (PTD) and dependents’ benefits — The maximum annual adjustment was raised from 2% to 3% and the date of the first adjustment was moved from the fourth anniversary of the injury to the third anniversary.

Contingent claimant attorney fees — The maximum contingent claimant attorney fee is 20% of the first $130,000 of compensation awarded to the injured worker, with a cap of $26,000 in contingent fees. Previously, the maximum was 25% of the first $4,000 of compensation and 20% of the next $60,000, with a cap of $13,000 in contingent fees.

Scheduling of administrative conferences in rehabilitation disputes — In rehabilitation request disputes, except where the dispute is about payment for services already provided or there is good cause, an administrative conference must be scheduled to occur within 21 days of when the request was received.

The following provision took effect for medical request disputes filed on or after May 17, 2013.

Jurisdiction in medical disputes — The monetary limit on DLI jurisdiction in medical disputes does not apply where the dispute is about the amount of payment for medical services, articles or supplies.

2015 law change

The following provision took effect for inpatient hospital services provided on or after Jan. 1, 2016.

Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) System for hospital inpatient services — Minnesota changed its system for paying for workers’ compensation hospital inpatient facility services from a charge-based system to one based on Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). This system is often called a “DRG” system because payment is based primarily on the diagnosis-related group, which categorizes the major diagnosis and principal procedures performed. For non-catastrophic cases at non-Critical-Access hospitals, the payment is 200% of the Medicare level, not to exceed the charged amount. DLI estimated that in its first year, the new system reduced inpatient hospital cost by 9% to 16%, total medical cost by 1.3% to 2.3% and total workers’ compensation system cost by 0.5% to 0.8% relative to what they would otherwise have been. 89

Minnesota’s DRG statute also has a set of provisions regarding bill payment and denial. 90

2018 law change

The following provisions took effect for injuries on or after Oct. 1, 2018.

Temporary partial disability (TPD) duration limit — The maximum duration TPD benefits was raised from 225 to 275 weeks, not to extend beyond 450 weeks after injury.

PPD benefit schedule — The PPD benefit schedule raised by a uniform 5% for all impairment ratings.

Retirement age for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits — The PTD “retirement age,” at which PTD benefits cease, was raised from 65 to 67 years or the point where five years of those

88 Other statutory changes have occurred since 2013 (other than the 2015 change regarding inpatient hospital payments described below), but they do not significantly affect the trends in this report.


90 See Glossary (Appendix A) for details.
benefits have been paid, whichever is later. In addition, the provision allowing the injured worker to rebut the presumption of retirement (and consequent benefit cessation) was removed.

DLI estimated that these three benefit increases would raise total indemnity cost by 2.0% and total workers’ compensation system cost by 0.6% relative to what they otherwise would have been.

The following provisions took effect for medical services provided on or after Oct. 1, 2018.

**Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System (ASCPS)** — Payment for ambulatory surgical center (ASC) facility services was set at lesser of 320% of Medicare or the usual and customary charge of all services, supplies, and implantable devices provided. DLI estimated that this would reduce payments to ASCs by 20 percent, total medical cost by 2.1% and total workers’ compensation system cost by 0.7% relative to what they otherwise would have been.

**Hospital Outpatient Fee Schedule (HOFs)** — Payment for certain hospital outpatient facility services was changed to be based on portions of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) that relate to major surgical procedures and emergency department (ED) visits. As provided by statute, DLI set the payment levels under the new system, separately for small and large hospitals (those with up to 100 beds and with more than 100 beds, respectively), so that estimated outpatient payments would be the same under the old and new systems.  

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See Glossary (Appendix A) for details.
Appendix C
Data sources and estimation procedures

This appendix describes data sources and estimation procedures for those figures where additional detail is needed. Two general procedures are used in many places in the report: (1) “development” of statistics to incorporate the effects of claim maturation beyond the most current data; and (2) adjustment of benefit and cost data for wage growth to achieve comparability over time. After a general description of these procedures, additional detail for individual figures is provided as necessary. See Appendix A for definitions of terms.

Developed statistics — Many statistics in this report are by accident year or policy-year (insurance data) or by injury-year or vocational rehabilitation (VR) plan-closure year (Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) data). For any given accident, policy, injury or VR plan-closure year, these statistics grow, or “develop,” over time because of claim maturation and reporting lags. This affects a range of statistics, including claims, costs, dispute rates, attorney fees and others. Statistics from the DLI database develop constantly as the data is updated from insurer reports received daily. With the insurance data, insurers submit annual reports to the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWCIA) giving updates about prior accident and policy-years along with initial data about the most recent year. If the DLI and insurance statistics were reported without adjustment, trend data would give invalid comparisons because the statistics would be progressively less mature from one year to the next, especially for the most recent years.

MWCIA uses a standard insurance industry technique to produce “developed statistics.” In this technique, the reported numbers are adjusted to reflect expected development between the current report and future reports. The adjustment uses “development factors” derived from historical rates of growth (from one report to the next) in the statistic in question. The result is a series of statistics developed to a constant maturity, for example, to a “tenth-report” basis. The developed insurance statistics in this report were computed by DLI Research and Statistics using tabulated numbers and associated development factors from the MWCIA.

Research and Statistics has adapted this technique to DLI data. It tabulates statistics at regular intervals from the DLI database, computes development factors representing historical development for given injury-years and then derives developed statistics by applying the development factors to the most recent tabulated statistics. For example, in Figure 2.1, the developed number of paid indemnity claims for injury-year 2019 (in the numerator of the indemnity claim rate) is 22,200 (rounded to the nearest hundred). This is equal to the tabulated number as of Oct. 1, 2020, 20,098, multiplied by the appropriate development factor, 1.105. In this manner, the annual numbers in any given time series are developed to a uniform maturity.

The level of maturity to which the numbers in a time series are developed depends on the length of history available on the statistics concerned. The DLI injury-year statistics in Chapters 2 and 3 are at a 35-year maturity. In Chapter 4, the injury-year statistics are at a 10-year maturity and the VR plan-closure year statistics are at a seven-year maturity. In Chapter 5, the dispute rates by injury-year are at 29-year maturity and the rates of attorney involvement and of claim denial by injury-year are at 34-year maturity.

92 Development occurs in VR plan-closure year data because a claim may have more than one VR plan and the plan-closure year statistics are computed for all plans combined, categorized by the closure year of the last plan.
All developed statistics are estimates and are, therefore, revised each year in light of the most current data. DLI periodically reviews the developed statistics to determine their stability over time and, thus, their suitability for publication. Through this process, DLI has determined some of the developed statistics from its own data for the most recent injury-years are not sufficiently stable for publication. As a result, some of the injury-year trends from DLI data in this report extend only through 2016 or 2017.

Adjustment of cost data for wage growth — For reasons explained in Chapter 1, all costs in this report that are expressed per claim or per vocational rehabilitation plan are adjusted for average wage growth. The cost number for each year is multiplied by the ratio of the 2019 statewide average weekly wage (SAWW) to the SAWW for that year, using the SAWW reflecting wages paid during the respective year. Thus, the numbers for all years represent costs expressed in 2019 wage-dollars.

Figure 2.1 — The developed number of paid indemnity claims for each year is calculated from the DLI database. The annual number of medical-only claims is estimated by applying the ratio of medical-only to indemnity claims for insured employers to the total number of indemnity claims. (The ratio is unavailable for self-insured employers.) The MWCIA, through special tabulations, provides this ratio by injury-year for compatibility with the injury-year indemnity claims numbers.

The number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) workers covered by workers’ compensation is estimated as total nonfederal unemployment insurance (UI) covered employment from the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) multiplied by average annual hours per employee (from the annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, conducted jointly by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and state labor departments) divided by 2,000 (annual hours per full-time worker). Nonfederal UI-covered employment is used because there is no direct data about workers’-compensation-covered employment.

Figure 2.2 — Market-share percentages are taken from undeveloped counts of paid indemnity claims from the DLI database. Using undeveloped rather than developed claim counts has little effect on the percentages, because the number of indemnity claims develops at nearly the same rate for the different insurance arrangements.

Figure 2.3 — Claim and loss data is from supplementary tables to the MWCIA’s 2020 Minnesota Ratemaking Report. This data comes from insurance company reports on claim and loss experience for individual policies for the voluntary market and the Assigned Risk Plan. The reported losses include paid losses plus case-specific reserves. Data is developed to a 10th-report basis using the development factors in the Ratemaking Report, which produces statistics at an average maturity of 10.5 years from the injury date; the statistics are then adjusted for average wage growth.

Figures 2.4 and 2.5 — Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are based on paid losses, because paid losses are more stable from year to year than are paid losses plus case reserves. The data is from financial reports to the MWCIA by voluntary market insurers only. Paid losses are developed to a uniform maturity of 30 years (a “30th-report basis”) using development factors computed from year-to-year loss development data supplied by the MWCIA. Payroll data for Figure 2.4 is from insurer reports of policy experience.

Figure 2.6 — The pure premium rate data comes from the MWCIA’s Minnesota Ratemaking Reports for the years shown. Beginning with 2016, MWCIA has expressed the losses in the pure premium rates at progressively higher levels of maturity. In the Ratemaking Reports for those years, the MWCIA indicates the component of change in the pure premium rates that is attributable to this progressively higher maturity level. This component is a positive number because it reflects an increasing maturity level over the period in question. In Figure 2.6, this component is removed from the pure premium rates to produce a uniform maturity level over time.

Figure 2.7 — For insured employers, total cost is computed as written premium adjusted for deductible credits, minus paid policy dividends. Written premium and paid dividends for the
voluntary market are obtained from the Department of Commerce. Written premium for the Assigned Risk Plan (ARP) is obtained from AON Risk Services, the plan administrator. (There are no policy dividends in the ARP.)

Written premium is adjusted upward by the amount of premium credits granted with respect to policy deductibles to reflect that portion of cost for insured employers that falls below deductible limits. Deductible credit data through policy-year 2018 is available from the MWCIA. The 2019 figure was estimated by applying the ratio of deductible credits to written premium for the prior two years to the 2019 premium figure. When the actual amount becomes available for 2019, that year’s total cost figure will be revised.

For self-insured employers, the primary component of estimated total cost is pure premium from the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association (WCRA). A second component is administrative cost, estimated as 10 percent of pure premium. The final component is the total assessment paid to the Special Compensation Fund (SCF), net of the portion used to pay claims from defaulted self-insurers, since this is already reflected in pure premium.

Total workers’ compensation covered payroll is computed as the sum of insured payroll, from the MWCIA, and self-insured payroll, from the WCRA. Insured payroll was not yet available for 2019. This figure was extrapolated from actual figures using the trend in nonfederal UI-covered payroll (from DEED) and the trend in the relative insured and self-insured shares of total pure premium (from the WCRA).

**Figure 2.8** — The percentages in this figure were derived from payment year data to avoid significant issues that would arise with injury-year (or accident year) data. A major issue is that both paid benefits and total system cost (primarily the latter) vary substantially from year to year, causing major variation in the ratio of the two. Therefore, the percentages in this figure were derived by averaging data over time.

Data about benefits and state agency administrative cost came from DLI, the MWCIA, the Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Association and the Minnesota Self-Insurers’ Security Fund. Total system cost was calculated as indicated in connection with Figure 2.7. The percentage of cost going to insurer expenses was calculated as a residual as described below.

Because written premium — the primary element in system cost — relates to policies originating in a given year, it is paid during that year and the year following. Therefore, the ratio of benefits to system cost was computed using system cost for the year prior to the benefit payment year. An analysis of the data reveals that this ratio varies through approximately an 11-year cycle. To minimize annual fluctuation, an average over this cycle was used. To further reduce annual fluctuation, an average of averages was used, corresponding to the 11-year cycles ending with the most recent year and the prior two years. This yielded the ratio 67.5 percent as the ratio of total paid benefits to total system cost.

The indemnity, medical and VR components of the 67.5 percent were then computed using the relative totals of these payments for 2019. VR benefits (counted separately here from indemnity benefits) are not directly available on a payment year basis, so a payment year version of these benefits was estimated from the injury-year series used for Figure 4.3.

The portion of total system cost not accounted for by benefit payments, 32.5 percent, was then allocated between state agency administrative expenses and insurer expenses. State agency administrative expenses (using the same numbers as for Figure 3.14) were estimated to account for 2.3 percent of total system cost, leaving an estimated 30.3 percent attributable to insurance expenses (for insurers and self-insurers).

**Figure 3.1** — Statistics are derived in the same manner as for Figure 2.3, with one modification. Figure 3.1 presents data by claim type. For permanent total disability (PTD) and death cases, the number of claims and their average cost fluctuate widely from one policy-year to the
next because of small numbers of cases. Therefore, to produce more meaningful comparisons among claim types, PTD and death claims and losses were estimated by applying respective percentages of claims and losses (relative to the total) during the most recent five years to total claims and losses for 2017.

**Figures 3.3 and 3.4** — Average benefit duration (Figure 3.3) is computed by dividing the average weekly benefit (Figure 3.4) into the average benefit per claim where it was paid (Figure 3.5) (using developed statistics). This method is used because of issues relating to relatively more frequent under-reporting of duration for longer claims.

**Figure 3.14** — Administrative cost is computed to capture that portion of the workers’ compensation assessment (see “Special Compensation Fund” in Appendix A) that pays for state administration. Consequently, administrative cost is computed as the total of costs other than workers’ compensation benefits that are paid for by the assessment or other revenues with which it is combined, minus those other revenues.

**Figure 4.6 through 4.8 and 4.11** — These figures are by vocational rehabilitation plan-closure year beginning with closure year 2005. Since the vocational rehabilitation data is only available beginning with plans filed in 1998, a uniform seven-year window prior to each plan-closure year is used to make the statistics comparable across closure years.

**Figures 5.13 to 5.19** — To make the statistics comparable over time, a constant observation window of one year from the receipt date of the medical request, rehabilitation request, mediation request or administrative conference request was used. Only events that happened within that window were counted.